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EUROPE AND AFRICA:
FAIDING MEMORIES, FRAYING TIES?

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR


The relations between France and Africa are not nostalgic, but one of grand ambition to conquer the difficulties of crisis, and share with you the struggles of the rest of the world.

--Edouard Balladur, French Prime Minister, July 1994

It is time this petty political game was exposed. Europe must realize that the bad old days of the colonial era ended decades ago. Africa is not in anyone's back yard, not in France's, Belgium's or Britain's.

--Glenys Kinnock, British Labourite, September 1994

The key principle of our African policy is that Africans must take responsibility into their own hands for their future.

--Frank Vandensbroecke, Belgian Foreign Minister, February 1995

It is no longer a secret that the fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989 triggered a severe loss of Western interest in Africa, a vacuum filled by emergency workers in "T" shirts and Khaki trousers. African countries face the threat of political and economic isolation.

--Jose Chipunda, General Secretary, All-Africa Conference of Churches, April 1995

INTRODUCTION

Relations between Europe and Africa invite analysis as one way of comprehending ongoing transformations in global politics. Forged during colonialism, these relations have undergone considerable changes in the intervening years. During this period, historical memories sustained a wide array of institutional ties, creating a sense of collective responsibility and destiny, even though, on balance, equally powerful memories of conquest and subjugation characterized these relations.

This study analyzes the dominant trends in Euro-African relations in the past three decades with an eye to projecting future scenarios. I proceed from the premise that ongoing changes reflect both the decreasing salience of Africa in Europe and the processes of European integration and that these changes are inevitable as necessary steps in the completion of Africa's self-determination. Expressed differently, when memories fade, they do provide the ideal environment for innovation and experimentation with new institutional links.

My argument is embedded in two conflicting historical and contemporary trends that characterize these relations. On the one hand, European integration, starting with the 1957 Treaty of Rome, nurtured the institutional contours of Euro-African relations. On the other, the completion of European integration in recent years through the Maastricht Treaty has produced a different outcome with increased pressures for severing these very links.

In Africa, the Treaty of Rome arose in the ideological climate of nationalism and self-determination, movements that became part of Africa's organizational tools for political decolonization. Maastricht, however, is occurring in the context of an ideological vacuum and political weakness, with inchoate programs for meaningful African economic decolonization. While Europe is disengaging from Africa as a result of integration, Africa is fragmenting both for lack of internal integration and viable approaches to disengagement from Europe.
As an account of the difficult road from Rome to Maastricht, this analysis proceeds thusly. First, in discussing the formative years, I focus on the economic dimensions of Euro-Africa relations, primarily the Lomé Convention process. Second, I concentrate on the political dimensions, using the markedly different approaches of Britain and France. Third, I will shift the focus to the impact of recent global changes on the state of these relations. This shift will also allow me to pinpoint some of the ongoing debates about the future.

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: FROM ROME TO LOMÉ

Europe's relations with Africa have been dominated by two contrasting perspectives, Euro-Africanism and dependency schools. The first advanced the notion of continued economic and cultural ties as colonialism gave way to self-government and political independence. The dependency argument, on the other hand, decried such continuity, prescribing Africa's disengagement from colonial ties to achieve real self-determination. These schools have found adherents on both sides of the continental and ideological divides, coexisting uneasily as part of a postcolonial discourse.2

From its inception, Euro-Africanism was primarily a French idea reflecting France's intention to maintain institutional links with its colonies beyond the decolonization phase. As discussions for the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) concluded in 1957, the French succeeded in convincing the five other European partners to make provisions for overseas and colonial territories under part four of the Treaty of Rome.4 The purpose of the association was to "promote the economic and social development of countries and to establish close economic relations with them and the community as a whole." Even though Africans did not participate in these deliberations, Euro-Africanism came to symbolize the tangible gains postcolonial Africa would derive from continued links with Europe.

Subsequently, Euro-Africanism found institutional expression in the Yaounde Convention of 1963, a series of economic agreements between former French and Belgian colonies and the EEC. Under Yaounde, Europe pledged to assist Africa's economic development by means of preferential trading links, financial aid, and technical assistance. Ten years later, when the United Kingdom acceded to the European Community (EC), former British colonies became part of an expanded agreement, the Lomé Convention. The EC and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries signed the first five-year Lomé Convention in Togo in 1975. Even when the convention was extended to Caribbean Commonwealth and Pacific countries, Africa remained the major player and beneficiary in the ACP group.

The dependency argument derived inspiration from radical versions of Pan-Africanism, espoused most forcefully by Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah. Ghana became the first independent African state in 1957, the year when Europe launched the Treaty of Rome. Although initially committed to realizing political independence as a prelude to building economic viability, Nkrumah became increasingly convinced that Africa's association with Europe would forever condemn it to perpetual economic dependence. What was the common market, he asked, if not a new design by Europe to reimpose its domination and exploitation of Africa?9

The radicals in general were skeptical of Euro-Africanism's grand design, deriding it as "collective neocolonialism." They advanced three objections. First, economic association with Europe would have an adverse effect on their capacity to make decisions as independent actors. Second, institutional links that gave preferences to some African states would result in economic balkanization and undercut corresponding attempts to build Africa's own institutions, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Third, in the early 1960s, the dependency argument provided a strong statement against what Ghana and Nigeria saw as France's inordinate influence in West Africa. Even after the Lomé Convention replaced the Yaounde Convention, Franco-Nigerian rivalry in the greater West Africa remained a constant feature.

The Lomé Convention reflected the triumph of Euro-Africanism over Pan-Africanism. It had more adherents because it sprang from an ineluctable economic reciprocity: postcolonial Africa as a producer of raw materials and primary commodities still depended on European capital and markets. As long as Europe guaranteed and affected prices for these products, Africa would not disengage speedily. Moreover, most African states were receptive to privileged relations that assured them development grants and assistance to meet the growing demands on their juridical independence. For Europe, postcolonial Africa endured as a source of raw materials, market for manufactured goods and technology, and outlet for capital investment. But these developmental imperatives did not denude dependency of its compelling explanation of power asymmetry. The realism of Euro-Africanism could not obscure the persisting inequalities in power between the two blocks. Over time, as I. William Zartman succinctly shows, Africa was to become merely a nonaligned part of the Western alliance.10

Although primarily an economic process, the political underpinnings and contexts in which various Lomé Conventions were negotiated often offered better barometers for assessing the nature of the Euro-African relations.11 As a multilateral economic arrangement, the Lomé I Convention was negotiated in the global context of burgeoning Third World commodity power, power that promised to undo economic inequalities between the north and south. When members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) flexed their economic muscle during the 1970s, they emboldened the Third World to embark on the global crusade of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

Responding to this clamor, Europe posited Lomé I as a path-breaking "partnership of equals" that would constitute the paradigm for relations between poor and rich nations.12 For Africa, the convention heralded a new arrangement in which the collective clout of the Third World could begin to nibble at the admittedly asymmetrical relationships. That actors with stark imbalances in levels of development and resource endowment could engage in multilateral cooperation seemed to underscore the promises in the politics of global interdependence, so fashionable in the 1970s. Lomé's multifaceted institutional arrangements for dialogue, such as the Council of Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors, and the Consultative Assembly, placed Euro-African relations on a sound basis.13

Lomé I had several economic provisions that laid the foundations for future agreements. First, it established the Stabilization of Export Earnings (Statex), a system of maintaining the revenues of primary commodity exporters against sharp falls in production or price. Second, Europe removed the reciprocity clause in trade relations, allowing the ACP states to gain access to its vast markets without similar access to the ACP markets. More significantly, Lomé I offered $3 billion worth of aid, most of it to Africa, under the European Development Fund (EDF). Through direct contributions by the EC member-states, EDF was replenished every five years and disbursed in the form of grants. Except for a slight increase in EDF levels and establishment of a new stabilization program for minerals (SYSMIN), Lomé II of 1980 was not different from the original agreement.14

The environment surrounding Lomé III Convention negotiations was characterized by recession in Europe and increasing deprivation in Africa. Unlike the euphoria of 1975, the 1982-1983 recession in Europe changed the bargaining framework, making the EC reluctant
to concede on most economic issues while also rendering Africa powerless and vulnerable.\textsuperscript{15} More critical, these negotiations gave Europe the opportunity to start reexamining its relations with Africa as a whole.

When the talks formally opened in November 1983 in Brussels, two pertinent issues—“policy dialogue” and human rights—became the source of acrimony and protracted debate. Edgar Pisani, then the EC’s development commissioner, adroitly advanced the concept of policy dialogue as a means of ensuring Europe’s greater voice in how Africa spent aid and development assistance. For Europe, a dialogue on development policies was necessary to ensure a better and more efficient utilization of foreign aid; thus it requested the inclusion of provisions in the new treaty whereby the community could propose specific policies to each of its partners. While Europe was at pains to underline that it would not, à la Bretton Institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, make aid conditional on changes in ACP’s development programs, policy dialogue was to become the precursor for more interventionist policies in African development.\textsuperscript{16}

On their part, the ACP negotiators categorically rejected the demand for enshrining the policy dialogue provision in the convention by invoking the sovereignty argument. By the same token, they rejected Europe’s demand for a human rights charter that would make aid conditional upon the recipient countries observing some minimum standards of fundamental human rights.\textsuperscript{17}

Human rights and policy dialogue as new concerns were driven by an unresolved, but pertinent, question in Euro-African relations. Decolonization had produced a working economic arrangement reflective of continental comparative advantage, but for how long would Europe remain oblivious to the debilitating politics of authoritarianism in Africa? If development assistance was to enhance economic decolonization through capacity-building, did Europe have an abiding responsibility to ensure that this assistance was not wasted on “cathedrals in the sand” and “runways in the bush”?\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, how was Europe going to deal with future Idi Amins, Marcias Ngemias, and Jean-Bedel Bokassas as they trampled upon their people on their numerous excursions to London, Brussels, and Paris in search of economic assistance and political respectability?

No less pertinent in discussions for Lomé III was the anguish over the volume of European aid to Africa. Although the ACP negotiators demanded that the aid package be increased from $4.5 billion under the Lomé II to $12 billion in the new one, Europe finally offered $8.5 billion, a decrease in real terms given population increases, inflation, and the addition of new African countries.\textsuperscript{19} But even this modest package was attributable more to wrangling within Europe rather than the ACP’s collective bargaining power. The French, in an attempt to ingratiate themselves with their Francophone constituency in Africa, prodded their European allies to be generous in their assistance to the ACPs. In addition to the reduction in aid levels, the policy dialogue and human rights issues, to the chagrin of ACP states, became part of Lomé’s standard operating procedures. Although they were not formally enshrined in the convention, the two sides agreed to promote consultation, efficiency, and accountability in economic decisions.\textsuperscript{20} Tony Hill summarizes the net result of Europe’s power at the end of Lomé III:

[even if . . . the ACP had played far greater tactical skills [in negotiations], it is very doubtful whether the new Convention would have differed greatly. The structure of political and economic relations between the EC and ACP states and the context in which the negotiations took place would have retained any extra influence brought to bear by better management, more cohesion, and better tactics on the part of the ACP group.\textsuperscript{21]}

Since collective clout had previously been the antidote to what radicals had described as collective neocolonialism, the decline of Africa’s bargaining power within the context of ACP signalled a radically new phase in Euro-African relations. As Kevin Watkins notes:

Despite the brave promises of equal political partnership and generous trade-development provisions, the sad fact [was] that for Africa, the Lomé Conventions [came] to represent little more than quinquennial aid-replenishment talks. . . . The reality under Lomé III was that Africa’s negotiating power was so weakened by the rude economic shocks of 1979-81 and the recession which followed that they were unable to negotiate hard and coherently with the EC. Africa was already on its knees.\textsuperscript{22}

The decline of Africa’s clout coincided with the start of Africa’s veritable economic crisis in the mid-1980s, symbolized cogently by the debt problem. Dominating negotiations for Lomé IV in 1988, the debt problem included government-to-government debt for many African countries. Prior to these talks, the Lomé process had been silent on debt in deference to the IMF, World Bank, and bilateral actors. In the face of the mounting debt crisis, Europe slightly shifted from its aid-development role in 1978-88 by agreeing to use some of the EDF for balance of payments support. As it assumed the role of debt relief, Europe also began to exercise the economic leverage contemplated under the policy dialogue, linking debt relief to stringent policy conditions. Furthermore, Europe started to coordinate its balance of payment policies with those of the IMF, World Bank, and other Western bilateral donors.\textsuperscript{23}

Amidst growing African concerns about the decline of their “privileged” position in Europe, some Europeans were also beginning to doubt the efficacy of Lomé’s trade provisions in stimulating trade and investment. A linepin of the Lomé process, market access, had by the 1980s clearly failed to stimulate diversification away from the traditional primary export commodities. Without diversification, Africa would, as the dependency theorists had contended, be condemned to maintain the status of international hewers of wood and drawers of water. But by the same logic, in sectors such as mining and manufacturing, Africa could not hope to diversify without significant direct foreign investment. The dilemma thus became how direct investment could be stimulated in the context of political instability and unfavorable economic conditions. Events on the African continent, such as the famines and civil wars of 1984-85, the decline in the standards of living, and accelerated population growth, did not seem to help the picture.\textsuperscript{24}

With the 1980s billed as the lost decade, Africa’s strategy in the negotiation for Lomé IV was to seek a radical overhaul of the convention. As an ACP document indicated:

It is evident that the present Lomé arrangement does not possess the capacity to deal with crippling problems such as debt, terms of trade losses, and structural adjustment problems . . . . The inability of the existing and previous Lomé arrangements to deal with these binding constraints represents their major limitation.\textsuperscript{25}

Yet rather than overthrowing the conventions, Lomé became a desperate attempt to maintain merely the gains of past conventions. The major innovation of Lomé IV became a ten-year convention with mid-term renegotiation of its financial provisions. With only marginal improvement on prior trade and aid provisions, Europe pledged more assistance to structural adjustment efforts in Africa. Although the ACP had demanded "a specific Lomé approach to structural adjustment" that would be free of the intervention and conditions of the Bretton Woods institutions, the EC insisted on following existing procedures of broader Western coordination.\textsuperscript{26}
The greater danger to Lomé at the end of the 1980s was European fatigue with a process that had so far not produced visible gains for aid recipients. Kevin Watkins has summarized this perception:

During [the Lomé] period, not one ACP country has entered the ranks of the newly-industrializing countries, and most are more dependent upon primary commodities than they were in 1975. Not only, it seems, has Lomé failed to stimulate trade dynamism or bring about structural change, it has failed in one of its principal stated aims—promoting the performance of the ACP countries in EC markets. It has been less successful in protecting the ACP countries from the effects of high-interest rates and slump in external capital flows. Economic growth and living standards in sub-Saharan Africa fell steadily behind those of other regions in the 1980s, with the result that . . . most people in the region are poorer in real terms than they were when Lomé I was signed.27

As Africa was declining, European integration proceeded as a deliberate process of strengthening the momentum established in Rome. In March 1985, the council of the EC called on the European Commission to prepare a comprehensive program for an internal market. In December 1985, the EC member-states passed the Single European Act (SEA), which was approved in July 1987. This legislation facilitated the creation of a European internal market in December 1992. At Maastricht in December 1991, Europe created the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), described as a quiet revolution that would accentuate its position as the world's leading trading bloc.39

PEELING THE ONION: POLITICAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS
Zartman has aptly likened Europe-Africa relations to peeling an onion: whereby the "removal of each form of postcolonial presence uncovers and renders vulnerable and unnecessary the next level of Euro-African relations."39 Fundamentally, this metaphor captures the twin concepts of decolonization and disengagement that are central to any discussion of how these relations have evolved.

Despite its disappointing record, the Lomé process was an attempt by Europe to come to grips with disengagement from its myriad colonial relationships. Through decolonization, Europe was set to reduce its political and military engagements; multilateral economic relations were to be the instrument to this goal. If postcolonial responsibilities could be shared by Europe in a collective framework, such cooperation would ease the burdens of disengagement for individual countries. With the immediate memories of colonialism serving to cement this new phase, most of Europe saw the benefits of multilateralism as providing African countries with the long-run capacity to manage their own affairs. Gradual political disengagement, eased by continued economic links, was one means for Europe to shade the other colonial layers while also building African capacity. But this broad perspective conceals variations in approaches, particularly among the primary actors, Britain and France.

The British approach toward its former colonies is a study in how different facets of decolonization were specifically designed for the ultimate end of total disengagement. By the time Britain committed its former colonies to the Lomé process, its presence in Africa had declined markedly. Except for the Rhodesian and South African problems that still occupied the energies of British administrations, Africa was, for the most part, peripheral to British interests. Colonial disengagement in the 1960s gradually gave rise to the subtle withdrawal of civil servants, teachers, economic advisers, and military experts in the early 1970s. By the 1980s, what remained of an outward British cultural presence were small offices of the British Council taking care of ever-decreasing numbers of rural agricultural experts.

Consistent with the reduction of its role in Africa, Britain had also deepened its relations within the multilateral umbrella of the Commonwealth. Though critical in British foreign policy in the 1970s, Commonwealth economic and cultural institutions began to lose their eminence partly because of Britain's economic problems and perceived burdens of a "lingerling and moribund empire." Moreover, as southern Africa's racial problems came to the forefront of international attention, the venerable Commonwealth Heads of State meeting became a lightning rod for African pressure on the British, a role that Whitehall detested. By the late 1970s, the African majority had, to the chagrin of the British, captured the Commonwealth to forge coherent international policies aimed at the emergence of nonracial regimes in southern Africa.40

By the early 1990s, the conclusion of southern African conflicts marked the end of African leverage in the Commonwealth and, with it, Africa's decline in British eyes. Dwindling technical, educational, and cultural exchanges have only increased British postcolonial aloofness. As John Ravenhill says: "British politicians, particularly in the period of Conservative party government since 1979, have given the impression that the colonial legacy is something of an embarrassment, a situation in which they are unwilling to invest any significant political energies."41 Richard Dowden provides a succinct account of Britain's decolonized African policy:

Britain has shown less and less interest in Africa in recent years. It is not just formal trade and investment links with Africa that have declined. The vital personal links are also being weakened by Britain. It is far harder for Africans to get visas to come to Britain and extremely difficult for anyone from Africa to find grants to study here. Britain now has 24 embassies and high commissions in sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn. . . . The existing posts support about 270 diplomatic staff, 20 per cent less than 10 years ago. . . . The last generation of colonial administrators absorbed into the Foreign Office at independence is gone, so there are fewer diplomats with personal knowledge of Africa. Not many young diplomats apply to go to Africa as their first choice; it no longer attracts the best and the brightest. And increasingly, Britain seeks to hide a European Union position in Africa.42

The French approach to its former colonies, on the other hand, never changed radically with the economic multilateralism of the 1960s and 1970s. In this respect, peeling the French onion has been a rather sticky and awkward process, propelled more by forces external to it than any deliberate action. Instead of decolonization as gradual disengagement, the French seemed to prefer a system of perpetual paternalism underwritten by sundry economic, political, and military advantages. Charles de Gaulle laid the foundations of this policy by establishing a pattern of interconnections between French and African states, leaders, businesses and political parties, designed to maintain French influence.

A critical institution for French dominance over its former colonies was the Franc Zone, a monetary cooperation agreement whereby African currencies were pegged at a fixed rate to the French franc. This zone allowed Paris to control the issuance and circulation of currency, the monetary and financial positions, and budgetary policies in Francophone Africa. Consequently, these countries exhibited the classical dependency and neocolonial syndrome of limited sovereignty. As Guy Martin observed:

Of fundamental importance is the fact that the wholesale importation of the French administrative, fiscal, judicial, and educational systems by these states necessarily leads to a situation of acute cultural dependency. Education and culture . . . constitute a priority area of cooperation and technical assistance, thereby helping to reinforce the cultural, technical, and political influence of the former colonial power through the diffusion of her language, thought processes, and behavioral patterns.43
Howard French compares the experience of Cote d'Ivoire where the president, Houphouet-Boigny, relied more on French civil servants than Ghana, which fostered local talent:

A rising Ghana seems to have been better served by a system that favored the employment of home-grown talents. With all of Ghana's coups and other setbacks, one of the most important, if almost unheralded, ingredients of the country's recent successes seems to be that Ghanaians, unlike their Ivoirian neighbors, have always been associated with the work of building their nation. With France now pulling back from the region with impressive speed, Cote d'Ivoire seems set to absorb precisely this lesson: There is no substitute for experience.44

France strengthened these cultural and economic links by concluding defense and military agreements with each of its former colonies; these agreements were renegotiated in the 1970s and extended to the former Belgian territories of Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire.53 By 1992, France had eight defense agreements and twenty-six accords covering technical military assistance with about twenty-three African states. These agreements either allow African states to call on French military assistance for internal or external defense or permit the presence of French military bases. In addition, France established a "rapid deployment" airborne force of about 13,000 capable of intervening at short notice almost anywhere in Africa from its base in France. With a permanent force in West Africa, France was able to intervene about twenty times in African conflicts between 1963 and 1983.54 Over time France sought to explain its military commitment as a necessary component of the development process. According to former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing: "Why do certain states ask us to take care of their security? It is because they do not have the resources to do it, and it would not be wise for them to use their limited resources to build up modern armed forces. Africa must allocate her resources to development projects."55

Like the British, the French also tried to expand their multilateral relations in Africa through formal institutions outside the Lomé framework; these institutions began as regional economic organizations comprising its former colonies. But as these organizations became ineffectual in their economic goals, French President Georges Pompidou initiated the annual Franco-African summit conferences in November 1973.38 In 1988, President François Mitterrand launched La Francophonie, a yearly meeting of all French-speaking countries on the lines of the British Commonwealth. As a result of the deterioration in African economies in the 1980s, a sizable number of non-Francophone countries had been recruited to the Franco-African summit; in 1983, for instance, more countries attended the summit in Vittel, France, than the OAU summit in Tripoli.39 This also explains why in the decisive Lomé negotiations of the mid-1980s, the French tried to ingratiate themselves with their weaker African allies against the interests of an increasingly reluctant Europe.40

For the French, formal institutions took second place to the elaborate and interlocking informal ties it developed in its African policies. Every French president since de Gaulle has developed his own politique réseau (network policy), a highly personalized system of intimate contacts with African leaders, ties that camouflaged conventional and more accountable state procedures. As Jacques Foccart, the principal author of network politics has recently revealed, the réseau was not just an instrument of brute force but a way of making policy: France pulled the strings, handpicked leaders still in power today, and drew enormous political and economic profit from the continent.41 An important instrument in this policy is the Ministry of Cooperation which disburses foreign aid under the tight control of the presidency.

When Mitterrand took over the presidency in 1981, he briefly sought "decolonize" Franco-African relations, breaking from the Gaullist tradition. More recent reports have revealed, however, that by December 1982, Mitterrand had already abandoned the new style and appointed his son, Jean Christophe, as the head of the Africa division in the president's office. During his fourteen years as president, Mitterrand used his authority to maintain personal control over his country's close political and economic ties with its former African colonies.

**MAASTRICHT TREATY AND CHANGING MULTILATERALISM**

The Maastricht Treaty followed on the heels of Mikhail Gorbachev's frontal attack on the pillars of communism in Eastern Europe. These two events produced a new dynamic in Euro-African relations, forcing even the procrastinating French to reassess the basis of postcolonial relations. Maastricht's goal of economic integration and consolidation has built a wall of uniform height around the expanding membership of the European Union (EU), keeping outsiders out.45 Since Africa had been at the apex of the "pyramid of privileges," the image of "fortress Europe" is real enough. New restrictions resulting from tighter health and environmental standards, greater harmonization of visa and immigration standards, and coordination of monetary policies have placed Africa at a disadvantage in Europe.46

Harmonization of EC laws for immigrants has been the most concrete expression of fortress Europe. In Article 100e of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU is set to harmonize its rules on visas for immigrants from non-EU countries.46 From June 1996, EU states will have a uniform three-months visa policy for third countries; refusal for a visa in one member state would mean exclusion from the rest of member-states. More important, the clause states, "The Council of European Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, shall determine the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the member states."48 The list, aptly dubbed the "blacklist," includes mainly black countries of Africa and the Caribbean.

While the advantage of the change for third-country citizens is the ability to travel throughout Europe on a single visa, uniformity greatly affects third-country nationals, notably most British Commonwealth citizens, currently entering Britain without a visa. For these countries, free entry into Britain was one of the few remaining privileges of postcolonialism. Under the new law, the only African Commonwealth countries whose nationals will not require a visa to visit Britain are Kenya and Malawi. As the debate over visa policies has grown, civic groups in Britain have complained of racism. In the words of one official: "The policy smacks of Euro-racism and is an extension of fortress Europe. It is a blacklist in the true sense of the term. Not a single white Commonwealth country is included. It shows that 'Article 100' has done nothing for the black community."47

Since disengagement has been a slow but deliberate process for Britain, the choice between the Commonwealth and Brussels does not seem to be too hard to make. Furthermore, Britain was unwilling to safeguard Commonwealth visa privileges that would alienate its allies, who all have instituted visa restrictions on their former colonies. As one observer commented: "I am afraid that the present British government is only paying lip service to the importance it attaches to the Commonwealth. It cannot see a political value in anything which does not yield an economic return. The government is more likely to subscribe to the common visa policy and blame the ensuing row on the European Community."48

The British have also reassessed their overseas commitments by freezing $1.5 billion of bilateral aid spent annually on developing countries. In the November 1994 budget, British
Chancellor Kenneth Clarke froze total spending on developing countries while boosting aid for Eastern Europe and multilateral institutions. Private agencies calculate that inflation and the shift in focus to Eastern Europe mean a 10 percent cut in aid to the poorest nations in Africa. In real terms, British aid will fall from 0.31 percent of gross national product (GNP) to an all-time low of 0.26 percent by 1995-1996. Furthermore, increased spending on Eastern Europe and on Third World disaster relief will mean less for traditional recipients in Africa.

The British squeezed bilateral aid programs to underscore their renewed emphasis on multilateralism and global burden-sharing. Although Britain still has the sixth largest aid program in the world, it is becoming clear that less of that aid will be within its direct control. Thus the share of British aid allocated to multilateral agencies increased from 37 percent in 1990-1991 to as much as 46 percent in 1992-1993; in 1993-1994, of the $2.8 billion of British overseas aid, $1.2 million was allocated through multilateral institutions and more than $1.5 billion bilaterally. The government intends to reverse these proportions in the future so that bilateral aid is only a tiny portion of all aid.

According to Baroness Linda Chalker, minister for overseas development, the shift to multilateral support will enable Britain to "maintain our contribution to the international aid effort to reduce poverty and suffering in the poorest countries, particularly in Africa and Asia." But critics of multilateral assistance charge that British bilateral aid is more effective, especially that devoted to voluntary agencies. John Howell, director of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), for instance, notes that "the EC has still got to prove itself as an effective aid donor... [since] European aid is bureaucratic and badly targeted. Money channelled through multilateral institutions is not felt to be very wisely spent."

The most significant departure from economic bilateralism in the early 1990s was the devaluation of the CFA, the common currency of former French colonies. Signalling the end of an era of cooperation, the fourteen African countries agreed in January 1994 to devalue by 50 percent the CFA franc—which had been pegged to the French franc at the rate of 50 to 1 since 1948. As some social analysts predicted an inflation-induced deluge of social upheavals and border conflicts, others hailed the devaluation as the start of much-needed monetary and financial independence. When African economies were hit by severe economic crises in the 1980s, the CFA's fixed parity emboldened these countries to borrow continually from France to pay off their bills. Consequently, African elites were able to afford expensive luxury consumer goods imported with the cushion of a fully convertible currency. Freed from this colonial relic, these elites could now be forced to begin searching for ways to manage their economic houses.

To many economists, the devaluation should have occurred much earlier to stimulate African exports that become much more competitive on the international market. By this logic, oil-producers, such as Gabon and Cameroon, and coffee and cocoa producers, such as Cote d'Ivoire, stood to gain from this feat of monetary independence. To cushion the impact of the devaluation, France promised to erase all, or a portion, of the public debt of the poorest and middle-income countries—amounting to $4.5 billion. International financial institutions also promised budgetary, import, and other support as part of a compensation package for countries most affected by the devaluation.

The French attitude toward the devaluation disguised the vital dilemma of balancing the imperatives of European multilateralism with decadent postcolonial economic policies. France's cooperation minister, Michel Roussin, claimed that Paris would no longer assume Africa's debts and that, by swallowing the bitter medicine, they could expect growth in the future. More poignantly, he added that "through the devaluation, the fourteen nations have given themselves the means to re-join the international community." Yet in reality, the devaluation was more a reflection of declining French maneuver within Europe and globally than any deliberate self-interested action on its part. While the World Bank and the IMF had long insisted that the CFA was overvalued, France was its most adamant advocate. With pressure from Washington and the impending monetary union in Europe, France began to move inexorably toward disengagement from the CFA. In September 1993, French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur warned that his country would help relieve the debt burden of Francophony countries only if they signed agreements with the IMF. As an African Development Bank official, Paul Susungu, observed:

Africa's French-speaking countries were too dependent on the goodwill of France. They hoped that the French government possessed political and economic clout to ward off the pressures of the IMF and World Bank for devaluation. But unfortunately market forces are far stronger than the political will of any government, even including the government of France. So they are now having to bite the bullet and swallow the bitter medicine.

While some Francophones were accusing France of "selling them out" to the demands of the Bretton Woods institutions, the devaluation reaped more benefits than most had anticipated. At a Paris meeting to review the effects of the move, there was consensus that it had made African products more competitive, both domestically and internationally, and thus boosted economic growth. Additionally, as a political and social act, it helped to redistribute incomes from urban to rural areas by offering agricultural producers higher earnings for exports. A year later Balladur could claim that between 1986-93, the standards of living in Francophone countries had fallen by 40 percent, due to an overvalued currency that undermined donor-driven economic reform program: "Today, by the grace of devaluation, international prices of primary commodities have shot-up, benefiting 80 percent of the populations in the affected countries."

As France and Britain shifted toward multilateralism, European countries with lesser commitments did the same, moving to reduce their bilateral assistance. For instance, in November 1994, Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced Bonn's multilateral strategy, the "global structural policy," in which the EU will assume a greater role in shaping policy on a wide variety of global issues in tandem with the other industrial nations. The centerpiece of this strategy is to tackle global political upheavals such as poverty and hunger, population growth, the flood of refugees, and environmental degradation by building on extant international mechanisms. In a gesture of multilateralism, Bonn cut Africa's total share of bilateral German Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) from 38.9 percent in 1994 to 36.8 percent in 1995; in 1993, Africa obtained 45 percent of Germany's overall bilateral ODA. In contrast, the economically booming continent of Asia got a large share of bilateral aid, 41.5 percent in 1995, up 2.7 percent on 1994.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL DECAY: TOWARD SOMALIA AND RWANDA

European multilateralism toward Africa is fundamentally an outcome of the Gorbachev revolution. With the demise of communism, this revolution removed the vestiges of Cold-War competition that had justified Western intervention and presence in postcolonial Africa. The West's singular approach to African conflicts—as diverse as the Congo/Zaire, Angola, Chad, and
Horn of Africa—amply demonstrated the fixation with containing communism. With the end of communism, Europe could now liberate itself from the geopolitical dimension of Eurasianism.

For Africa, the collapse of communism promised to free it of external constraints to evolve its own future. As Winrich Kühne notes, the tough new reality of postcommunism posed a challenge to Africa leadership:

Africans can either react with despair or with a "new realism," dropping past illusions and ideological daydreams and using the dramatic changes of their international environment as a challenge to solve their problems essentially by themselves by mobilizing their own resources. African politicians and intellectuals have to work hard for a new consensus among themselves and the people on this necessity. It should be at the center of the debate on more democracy, more participation, and more accountability.  

Democracy and participation did become the new clarion calls of Africans agitating for political change against the backdrop of global transformations. The initial waves of African democratization started in West Africa, where masses organized against the ossified regimes demanding national conventions that would draw up new constitutional arrangements. In the first eighteen months of the 1990s, upheavals and reforms in Benin begot diffusion effects in Mali, Niger, Togo, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire Sao Tome and Principe, and Zambia. As this wave of change engulfed the entire continent, observers spoke of a "new era of democracy" and the coming of a "second independence" for Africa.  

The initial upsurge of people's power benefitted from the confluence of three factors. First, three decades of authoritarian regimes in Africa had produced a gulf between state and society with consequences that the most recalcitrant dictators could no longer hide from. As Keith Somerville writes:

African autocrats promised economic progress in exchange for restrictions on political rights of their citizens. It was evident that economic progress in much of Africa had stalled or had been replaced by economic decline. . . . After 30 years of authoritarian rule, African states had not benefitted economically and in many cases had actually suffered stagnation, widespread corruption and a dramatic decline in the welfare and living standards.  

Second, the new crusade for governance and accountability that the World Bank and the IMF placed on the developmental agenda produced pressure for economic reforms, reforms that emboldened opposition parties and civic groups. In most of Africa, the World Bank and IMF imposed political conditions for economic reforms that were important in jump-starting the then stalled transitions to competitive politics. Third, European countries that had propped up African authoritarian regimes, considered strategic allies, were now able to jump on the governance and democracy bandwagons. Mitterrand gave an indication of this new attitude at the Franco-African summit in June 1990 at La Baule, France. French aid, he warned, would be "more tepid" toward "regimes which conduct themselves in an authoritarian manner without accepting evolution towards democracy," and would be "enthusiastic towards those who take the step with courage." Given the intensity of French involvement in African politics, La Baule became a belated, albeit larger, symbol of European support for democracy movements in Africa.

In support of African democratization in the early 1990s, the EU imposed economic and military restrictions against recalcitrant African leaders such as Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema, Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, and Malawi's Kamuzu Banda. In other coordinated measures, the EU suspended cooperation with Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Gambia, and Nigeria, either because of violations of human rights or the flouting of standards of good governance. In imposing sanctions against Eyadema, for instance, the European Parliament fiercely condemned the violation of human rights and backed a request from the opposition for a postponement of parliamentary elections. Describing the "regime of president Eyadema one of the most brutal dictatorships in Africa," the report acknowledged that "terror, murder and torture are a daily occurrence."  

Democratization promised to be a critical component of African capacity building that would at last provide a firmer foundation to political decolonization. For Europe, African democratization, by reducing incessant domestic conflicts that attracted foreign intervention, would have bolstered the Maastricht project, leaving Africa just a part of the multilateral globe. With no pressures or demands from Africa, Europe would now focus its economic and political attention on the "transition economies" of Eastern Europe.

Five years into the African democratization process, however, the balance sheet looks gloomy with few solid democracies. While elections had been held in more than thirty countries, few of them had made any progress toward institutionalization of new forms of political competition and accountability. In cases such as Zaire, the transition had virtually stalled at the stage of the national conference, demonstrating the enduring power of Mobutu. For the most part, remnants of former single-party regimes reverted back to their old authoritarian tactics by blatantly rigging elections and destroying the feeble opposition parties. Since 1991, only the opposition in Zambia, Malawi, Cape Verde, Congo, and Sao Tome and Principe have succeeded in unseating incumbent governments. Despite the wars in Angola and Mozambique, Portuguese-speaking countries, as a group, did better on the democratization scale than the French- and English-speaking ones.

Yet, the specter that was to haunt political change in Africa was that of state collapse, symbolized by Somalia and Rwanda. Although they both are good illustrations of the consequences of disintegrating local authority, Somalia and Rwanda reveal distinctive forms of external involvement with lessons for the future of Euro-African relations. The conflict in Somalia prior to the multilateral intervention of 1991 and 1992 is an example of the fratricidal power of local nationalism without the stability of the Cold-War umbrella. Having paraded for long as Africa's homogeneous state, Somalia confronted the necessity of dealing with accumulated problems of nation-building that had been postponed as its leaders invented diverse regional enemies with the support of willing superpowers. Collapse in Somalia was inevitable once the Cold War ended. Yet, it is through such collapse that the Somalis can forge their own local power equilibriums. The withdrawal of the United Nations forces in March 1995 against the background of persistent warlordism speaks to this imperative. Left to their own devices, the warlords can innovate politically, a necessary process of decolonization.

The genocide in Rwanda, while attributable to deep-seated ethnic hatreds, needs to be appraised as a case of delayed external disengagement from African conflicts. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the government of Juvenal Habyarimana and his Hutu-dominated army received considerable arms, military training, and technical assistance from France. Comfortable in this support, Habyarimana had continually refused to accommodate the interests of the minority Tutsi even after neighboring countries helped mediate a political framework for national reconciliation. In addition to French military aid, Habyarimana's government used multilateral aid earmarked for economic stabilization toward the acquisition of more military hardware from South Africa and Eastern Europe. As Michel Chossudovsky explains:

Since October 1990, the Armed Forces had expanded virtually overnight from 5,000 to 40,000 men requiring inevitably under conditions of budgetary austerity a sizeable influx of outside
money. The new recruits were largely enlisted from the ranks of the urban unemployed of which the numbers had dramatically swollen since 1989. Thousands of delinquent and idle youths from a drifting population were also drafted into the civilian militia responsible for the massacres. And part of the army purchases enabled the Armed Forces to organize and equip the militia. In all, from the outset of the hostilities... a total envelope of $260 million had been approved for disarmal (with sizable bilateral contributions from France, Germany, Belgium, the European Community and the US). 67

Habyarimana's efforts to stall national reconciliation contributed to emboldening the forces of extremism within his army. Immediately following his death in a plane crash in April 1994, Hutu extremists embarked on a campaign of massacres against the minority Tutsi until the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized power in July. Working against concerted external action in Rwanda was the paralysis produced by the debacle of UN intervention in Somalia: After ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed, the UN withdrew the paltry United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). With the Rwandan crisis at its height, the French launched "Operation Turquoise" in June 1994 to provide safe havens to ethnic Hutus fleeing the triumphant RPF. But French humanitarian actions at that point only fueled the barrage of accusations from critics about its government's broader involvement with Habyarimana and the last-ditch efforts to protect Hutu perpetrators of ethnic genocide.

As normalization and national reconciliation returned to Rwanda through the establishment of a governing coalition of five parties led by the RPF, France opposed the composition of the new government. Foreign Minister Alain Juppé insisted that the majority Hutus were not represented adequately in the government. Moreover, high on the French agenda was the unconditional return of a million Hutu refugees in camps in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. In the UN, France tried to keep the Security Council from qualifying the massacres of Tutsis as genocide and strove to give credit instead to a "mutual genocide."

In international economic institutions, Paris attempted to block all aid to the new government in Kigali. Toward this end, it mobilized against Rwanda's international creditors, using its strength within the EU to block the disbursement of aid to the cash-strapped government. 68 In October 1994, EU foreign ministers agreed to convert $180 million of long-term development aid for Rwanda under the Lomé IV Convention into medium-term measures for rehabilitation of essential services. But, at French and Belgian request, this aid was made conditional on RPF establishing a secure environment for the return of Hutu refugees. Instead, they supported the EU's plans to provide $625 million in humanitarian emergency assistance to refugees in camps. 69 Collette Braeckman, head of a French NGO (nongovernmental organization) noted that these conditions placed Rwanda in an impossible situation since the bankrupt government had no resources to guarantee the security of refugees: "It is evident that France has not abandoned its friends in Rwanda and they hope that their friends will return to power. It is doing all it can to withhold aid to the new government. 70 Most observers attributed French hostility toward the new government in Kigali to the intimate relations between French President Mitterrand and Habyarimana's family. 71 France's refusal to invite the RPF to the eighteenth Franco-African summit in Biarritz in November 1994 publicly demonstrated this antipathy. 72

The Biarritz conference marked another radical shift in France's policy toward Africa. Even as France sidelined the Rwandese government, it rehabilitated Zaire's Mobutu and Togo's Eyadema's, formerly vilified for their failure to democratize. As West Africa correctly said: "[Mobutu], like that other paleolithic survivor President Eyadema of Togo, now believes that, because they have clung on, the Western donors who preached democracy to them are forced once again to do business with them, and everything can go back to what it was before."

Mobutu's emergence as the key figure in Central Africa was invariably tied to the chaos in Rwanda, as Zaire became indispensable both to France's "Operation Turquoise" and UN relief efforts in Goma. In September 1994, the EU had, like France and Belgium, resumed development aid cooperation with Mobutu. While Zairian opposition and European NGOs complained about Mobutu's ties to the former Rwandese government and Hutu militias, Manuel Marin, EU commissioner for development policy, explained that a fresh dialogue and material support to Zaire would prevent Mobutu from reenacting these militias: "We have to look at things in political terms."

At Biarritz, therefore, Mitterrand could praise African democratization, yet noting, in the same breath, that it would be a "colonial reflex" for the French to isolate leaders they found undesirable. The Economist came closer to discerning the shift in French African policy:

Three years ago there was much talk in Paris about the desirability of helping the continent to move towards democracy. But recent democratic experiments in French-speaking Africa—in Congo, Gabon, and Niger—have made some Frenchmen think that democracy does not readily breed the conditions that suit French business and strategic interests. 73 Some Frenchmen argue that long-serving strongmen such as Mr. Mobutu are good for stability; curiously, since Zaire is not exactly a model of stability. 74

To a Zairian opposition figure, "France is doing that purely for its own short-term interest. It wants a share in the Gemains copper mines in Zaire and at the same time Paris wants to control this French-speaking country, which is the largest in Africa."

The Biarritz conference also afforded a forum for Mitterrand to deliver his swan song in anticipation of French presidential elections, but this song reiterated continuity rather than visible change in France's African policy. Expressing the wish that "those who will have control of the country's affairs" after him would maintain the strength of the Franco-Africa partnership, Mitterrand said that "France must keep its path and refuse to reduce the African ambition" since "France would no longer be totally herself in the world's eyes if it gave up on its African presence."

THE FUTURE IN THE PRESENT: THE NEW REGIONALISM

Mitterrand rightly claimed at Biarritz that "France is the only industrialized country that tries to be an advocate for the justified interests of Africans . . . [providing aid] . . . three times that of the World Bank and twice that of the United States."

A somber admission of a French rear-guard struggle against recalcitrant Europe, this statement reflects the ongoing trend of Europe's economic and political disengagement from Africa. With or without significant change in African political systems, the process of a new multilateralism under which Europe shades its precarious ties with the continent is unlikely to ebb. The only promising component of this policy is the corresponding attempt by Europe to forge new relations with some African regional institutions.

Europe's exhaustion in funding overseas development is a critical factor in the new multilateralism, but the primary impetus is the erosion of the trade preferences of the Lomé process through global trade liberalization. Set up precisely because African commodities were not competitive enough, these preferences allowed market access with few limitations. But in the context of an emerging international trade regime, the World Trade Organization (WTO), successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Europe sees little value in sustaining these preferences. After the signing of WTO, European officials gave notice that the
Lomé Convention's thirty-year trade preferences would be progressively phased out since they would contravene global trade liberalization.

An ACP report detailing the balance sheet of winners and losers from WTO indicates that the biggest losers would be countries that depended on one or two commodity exports such as cocoa, coffee, and minerals. Overall, these states stand to lose about $173 million per annum of revenue or 0.7 percent of the total value of their sales to the EU. Significantly, phasing out the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) - the system of tariffs and quotas for textiles - over ten years will erode ACP preferences for textiles and clothing since ACP states have so far been exempt from the MFA's restrictions. The report concludes that although textile exporters will face higher competition, their sales to other markets could improve as a result of the abolition of restrictions. "The exploitation of these new opportunities is crucial for the future performance of ACP trade, in particular when one recognizes that this will not be the last time that Lomé preferences are eroded."79

The report's gloomy findings constituted the basis for ACP states' demand for $2.4 billion from the EU to compensate for losses incurred as a result of WTO. EU officials, however, dismissed these claims, publicly stating that the EU is not in the business of giving cash injections to compensate for WTO, rather than compensation, they noted, ACP states should focus on how to make their goods competitive in global markets.80 For Africa, trade liberalization neither helps its severe dependence on the export of a few primary commodities nor does it make its goods competitive. Its less than 3 percent share of world trade is thus bound to dwindle. As one African economist noted: "The new rules will liberalize access to markets. But, there is no way a country like Zimbabwe can penetrate a major industrial market like Japan. Basically the rules will result in developed countries swamping the fragile economies of the Third World."81

WTO provides Europe with the means of hiding under international legality while divesting itself of most of the responsibilities under Lomé. For the Germans, especially, commitment to an open and efficient multilateral world trade system remains the best framework for preserving the interests of European and Western economies, as well as maintaining ties with developing countries as a whole. Moreover, they see WTO as an antidote to the risks of unhampered regionalism manifested in the proliferation of potentially protectionist geographical trading blocs.82

If trade preferences were to be increasingly whittled away by global forces of liberalization, Lomé's future would hinge primarily on aid and development assistance. But the acrimonious negotiations since November 1994 over funds for the mid-term review of the current Lomé IV Convention demonstrate Europe's increasing unwillingness to sustain this relationship. Since Lomé funds come directly from the EU's member countries, discussion over aid levels has always given rise to squabbling about member contributions.

With the ACP states demanding grants closer to $22 billion, the French presidency of the EU suggested increasing grants from $13.5 billion to $18.3 billion. This proposal would include a 20 percent increase over the funding previously earmarked from the original twelve member-states and contributions from EU newcomers Sweden, Finland, and Norway. But two of the EU's top contributors, Germany and Britain, pushed for severe reductions.83 By the end of February 1995, faced with British and German demands for cuts in contributions, the French presidency had so far only managed to put together pledges of some $15.9 billion, below its bare minimum target of $18.3 million.84 At this reduced rate, the EU also imposed tough and new conditions. Departing from past practice, the EU suggested a staggered system of aid disbursement with only a percentage of aid earmarked being given at the outset. In this manner, the EU would be better able to reward countries using aid efficiently and penalizing those that did not. In addition, the EU demanded the right to curtail aid immediately in case of violations of human and democratic rights.85

As the most telling sign of the EU's slackening interest in Africa, the wrangle over the level of funding to ACP states coincided with statements by high-level EU officials casting doubt on the future of the relations. In January 1995, the new director of EU development policy, Joao Deus de Pinheiro, called for a "rebirth" of ACP-EU cooperation, instructing the EU's Development Directorate, which drafts policy for ACP states, to begin dialogue with ACP states on the post-2000 scenario: "The end of the cold war has cooled the North's interest in the African, Caribbean and Pacific states... Eastern and Central Europe are now more fashionable."86 In the same vein, Peter Pooley, EU's deputy director for development policy, admitted that there will be a very different European development policy at the turn of the century with changes that will hurt ACP states: "Looking into the crystal ball in seven or eight years' time I do not see the Lomé Convention continuing in its present form. I envisage a less exclusive Lomé framework."87 Furthermore, reducing the ACP countries' privileged historical positions as ex-colonies would mean that in the future Europe would extend preferential access to its market to other developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).88

Gradual disengagement for the EU has been softened by vigorous attempts to forge ties with countries in regional geographical proximity. Since the early 1990s, EU leaders have underlined the economic and political significance of regionalism. Billed as the future mode of partnership, Europe sees regionalism as an easier way of strengthening cooperation and dialogue with diverse countries without the burdens and demands of bilateralism. At a conference on Africa in Maastricht in July 1990, the EU committed itself to strengthening economic integration in Africa.89

In Africa, regionalism has focused primarily on southern Africa, translating into intensified cooperation with southern African states under the rubric of the South African Development Community (SADC), comprising Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.90 Regionalism in southern Africa also coincides with the reemergence of post-apartheid South Africa as a political and economic power center that will serve as a conduit for European interests in southern-central Africa. Demonstrating South Africa's importance, for instance, Belgian Foreign Minister Frank Vandenbroucke announced a dramatic shift in policy amounting to disengagement from central Africa to more involvement in southern Africa. South Africa, he pointed out, "could well become an example for other countries, creating new opportunities for the African continent and offering prospects for economic cooperation with Europe and Belgium.91

South African officials have, in turn, responded to Europe's interest by stressing the importance of southern Africa as a region. According to Deputy President Thabo Mbeki:

A market of 100 million people in southern Africa is more attractive to Europe than 40 million. . . . We need to present ourselves as a region. By linking our industries and cooperating with each other we stand a chance of competing more effectively with our more powerful global competitors. However, to achieve this objective we will request the European Union to bring our trade regime in line with that of the Lomé Convention to which our neighbors belong."92
The crowning moment for forging new links with southern Africa was the Berlin conference between EU and SADC ministers in September 1994. Both described it as marking the much-needed change from existing postcolonial relations into a partnership between Europe and southern Africa. For SADC, it was an opportunity to capitalize on the emerging belief in Europe that southern Africa holds the best chance of political and economic success in Africa while also learning from EU's experience with regional integration. In the Berlin Declaration, the two sides resolved to "promote democracy at all levels and the rule of law, respect for human rights, and promotion of social justice and good governance."

The Berlin initiative sees political stability and democracy as preconditions for economic investment and increased trade flows. For SADC, European private investment could be attracted to the region if member countries are willing to build political institutions for long-term domestic stability and respect for human rights. By creating the environment for increased private foreign investment, SADC countries hope to reduce their postcolonial dependence on European aid flows.

For the EU, private investment within regional structures promises to reduce the domestic pressures from taxpayers impatient with foreign aid bills. As Carl-Dieter Spranger, Germany's economic cooperation minister noted, Europe expects SADC to expedite regional integration "without concentrating too much on demands to industrialized countries for further funds for development cooperation." Subsequent technical meetings by SADC and EU in areas such as mining, trade, and tourism show the potential for European investment as the foundations for new economic relations.

Broader African response to the Berlin initiative was lukewarm. To critics, SADC's emerging relations are bound to divide Africa and ACP in the same manner as the nineteenth-century Berlin conference that partitioned the continent into European zones of influence. In the face of dwindling European interest in Africa, some critics argued, Africa needs a united voice in bargaining with the external world. Other critics noted Europe was eager to promote SADC at the expense of other competing regional organizations such as the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of Eastern and Southern African states. According to Uganda's minister of trade and industry, Richard H. Kajjuka:

Africa should be aware of this new Berlin Conference which aims to divide the continent indirectly, this time with the connivance of the Africans themselves. Instead of forging and strengthening cooperation among African countries, our fellow ministers are in Europe being told to break up the PTA. There is a strong undercurrent, mainly from Europe, to split the PTA. We reject it. We don't like it.

Despite the condemnation of the SADC-EU links, economic integration as one avenue of attracting private capital to bolster Africa's declining foreign investment has recently pervaded discussion on both continents. One of the positive outcomes of CFA's devaluation in West Africa is the potential for strengthening cooperation among the Francophones and West Africa as a whole, efforts that have long been stymied by France's monetary and financial strictures. For instance, within a year of the CFA's devaluation, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo embarked on a project to establish Africa's first common stock exchange that is expected to take off in April 1996. Its aim is to spur intraregional trade and foreign investment and to propel the Francophone countries toward economic and monetary integration within a revitalized regional monetary subgrouping-the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA). As one of its directors observed, "With privatization the new gospel all over the world, nothing can support its success better than a stock market."

UEMOA poses a direct challenge to the existing sixteen-nation Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which proposes a much wider common market shared by anglophone and Francophone countries. Yet its existence is new food for thought for West Africans contemplating the most effective regional structures for the future.

Amidst a UN report that showed that Africa is attracting less than 15 percent of all international investment compared to 50 percent for the Far East and 35 percent for Eastern Europe, recent dialogue between Africa and the West has focused on how to reverse this trend. Underlying these discussions is the economies of scale argument, whereby regional integration schemes become the central modes of private foreign and local investment. In March 1995, a Europe-Africa forum, "Show Confidence in Africa," highlighted the theme of Africa shifting from aid to private investment. Layashi Yaker, executive secretary for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), said that African nations must create the right environment for investment through "security, predictability, and regional cooperation. . . . Development will not come from foreign assistance but from investment for competitive production in a world of competition, not of solidarity." Similarly, a February 1995 investment conference in Libreville, Gabon, emphasized the links between structural adjustment programs, privatization, and regionalism. Herman Cohen, the former secretary of state for African affairs in the Bush administration, described the changing attitudes toward the private sector: "Africans now welcome [private] business--whereas 20 years ago, they did not. They were more interested in state-run enterprises. They were afraid of foreign investors--and even local investors. [Future] economic growth in Africa will not come from the state, but from the private sector."

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

Economic partnership of whatever hue ultimately hinges on sound political stability, the enigma of African politics since decolonization. As a UN Economic and Social Council report has emphasized: "So long as the political climate in many African countries remains unsettled and uncertain, the domestic and foreign investors' confidence in the economic policies and political directions of African countries will be damaged."

The false starts in democratization point to the continuing problem of building effective authority systems that provide order and legitimacy. Justifying France's rehabilitation of Mobutu and Eyadema, Foreign Minister Juppé warned that each African country must progress at its own pace: "It's a long, profound process to establish the rule of law, balance of power, transparency and decentralization. . . . There is a collective illusion about elections. They don't settle everything."

Even though elections are underrated as vehicles of political transformations, their contribution to fostering a participatory culture cannot be discounted. At present, Europe, through its economic power (and, sometimes, military power) to give or withhold, still plays a facilitative role in African political change, determining the shifts and direction in local power balances. Europe's power is not a sufficient condition for political change, but it is, nonetheless, often necessary as the contrasting cases of Kenya, Malawi, Zaire, and Togo demonstrate.

It is partly because of this realization that the EU has discussed the financing of a special corps, funded from the EU's development budget, to provide support for the democratization process in Africa. The EU has also been involved in mediating among factions in Gabon's political process, leading to an agreement between the government and
opposition parties aimed at resolving the country's political impasse. After the signing of the Paris Accords, EU mediators noted that these accords provided a useful model and set a precedent for democratization and political stability of other African states. More forcefully, the EU imposed sanctions on arms sales against Nigeria following the annulment of the June 1993 elections.

Military sanctions against Nigeria, however, expose an enduring dilemma in containing African conflicts. In West Africa, the Nigerian military has been very active since 1991 in a multilateral intervention force, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), under the auspices of the ECOWAS. ECOMOG and ECOWAS are two sides of a single story about the necessity of collective African economic and security mechanisms. These structures dovetail with renewed OAU attempts at forming methods for conflict anticipation, prevention, intervention, and resolution.

ECOMOG has attempted, with mixed results, to restore order and stability among the fractious groups in Liberia. Nigeria's dominant role in this conflict has also come under criticism both in the region and outside. Fundamentally, the question is whether it is to the advantage of the Nigerian leadership to sustain its regional intervention via ECOMOG at the expense of domestic democratization and demilitarization. Its heightened intervention in Sierra Leone to support a government under siege from rebels seems to support this contention.

Europe is consistent in pushing pressure on the Nigerian military to address its domestic problems. It is less consistent, however, when it speaks about African collective mechanisms of self-reliance, particularly when such mechanisms would inevitably revolve around regional power centers such as Nigeria. This is the same puzzle that confronts Europe in dealing with Zaire in the Rwandan conflict and Kenya in the Sudanese conflict: to what extent do external actors alienate regionally influential, but domestically decaying regimes, when these regimes are needed to intervene in more urgent cases of instability within their regional neighborhoods?

The problem of peacekeeping mechanisms constituted one of the most contentious issues on the agenda of conferences at Biarritz. Against the background of the Somali and Rwanda crisis, and the impending one in Burundi, Mitterrand suggested the possible creation of an inter-African military intervention force. In light of the failure of OAU's efforts, Mitterrand pledged support for such a force and promised to promote the idea in the EU and other international settings. Although the French were quick to note that Africans should have the responsibility to decide on the constitution, funding, and utilization of the force, there were sharp divisions among Francophone members on how to proceed with this idea.

Gabon's president, Omar Bongo, envisioned an initial force comprised exclusively of Francophone African members: "The idea of an African intervention force has germinated. We have not yet managed to do anything [in the OAU] because of financial, material and logistical problems. But we are going to take back history. We are going to begin at the Francophone level and will seek the involvement of the OAU and the U.N." President Blaise Compaore, of Burkina Faso, perhaps with ECOMOG in mind, rejected this approach on the grounds that one could not speak of a military intervention force in West Africa without the participation of Nigeria and Ghana. The anglophones at Biarritz greeted the idea with even less enthusiasm. Mbeki, South Africa's deputy president, indicated that his country would not take part in such a force, even though its army is the continent's most powerful. Rather than a French-inspired African peacekeeping force, Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe said the OAU needs to strengthen its own security mechanisms.

Not to be overshadowed by the French, the British have also expressed interest in helping Africans to find means of maintaining regional security. But unlike Mitterrand's inter-African military force, British Prime Minister John Major has suggested the formation of "conflict prevention mechanisms." Speaking to the South African parliament in September 1994, Major said:

"For years our energies have been consumed in trying to limit trouble after it has started. But it would be far less costly in lives and in other ways, if we are able to preempt that trouble before it began. I believe that an entirely new effort in preventative diplomacy is long overdue. With our friends in Africa, and with their agreement and with their participation, Britain wants to develop new mechanisms to head off conflicts before they become unstoppable. Before the bloodshed and the misery that we have seen becomes reality, let us see if we can head them off."

Both the British and French took their proposals to the United Nations, calling for comprehensive international initiatives to strengthen peacekeeping in Africa. At the opening of the forty-ninth UN General Assembly, Britain came up with an ambitious proposal to provide a new network of support systems in Africa. British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd contended that Africa needs support in areas from preventive diplomacy to humanitarian and peacekeeping deployment. Hurd proposed that the United Nations provide both an early warning system for conflict and, in cooperation with the OAU, a set of mechanisms for preventive diplomacy. Further, the United Nations needs to assist in transforming several African military staff colleges into "Peacekeeping Skills Centers," to develop training in peacekeeping discipline. As to how to proceed with these plans, Hurd called for using existing UN resources. For instance, UN logistic baring centers and mobile logistic teams, already present in Europe, could be used to improve the African troop responses to crises.

French Foreign Minister Juppé pledged Paris's support for some of those initiatives, adding that France was prepared to donate a standing unit of several thousand soldiers to help strengthen a proposed UN "stand-by" force equipped to handle global crises: "France obviously supports the principle of a mechanism for preventing, handling and settling conflicts in the framework of the OAU. . . . We are therefore ready to help set up military means to enable the Organization to intervene quickly, under UN control."

These ideas formed with UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's proposal to hand over some of the United Nations' peacekeeping functions to regional groups as a way of indicating the desire of advanced countries to reduce their involvement in conflicts such as Somalia. In a position paper on peacekeeping operations, Boutros-Ghali proposed a "division of labor" that is weighted more on the side of regional organizations than on the UN machinery. Even though some see these proposals as a necessary burdensharing, British ambassador to the UN, David Hanny, was more forthright when he noted that there was a growing reluctance on the part of many UN member-states to get involved "in messy situations in Africa."

CONCLUSION: PARTNERSHIP OR PATERNALISM?

As Europe prepares for the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference to review the 1991 Maastricht Treaty of European Union, there are two competing visions about its future relations with Africa: disengagement via multilateralism and engagement via paternalism. The former represents the dominant Anglo-German position, while the latter is the minority French position. The triumph of each position invariably lies more in contests within European politics than in
NOTES


18. Jeffrey Herbst, "Theories of International Cooperation," 639, makes reference to "cathedrals in the sand." "Runways in the bush" is my reading of recent attempts by Kenya's president Daniel Arap Moi to build an airport in his hometown.


50. Ibid.


54. Mamadou N'diaye, "France-Africa: The Horse and the Jockey," 34, reflected on French position: "With the French Treasury jealously guarding the franc zone by guaranteeing the African currency's convertibility on international markets, France has curtailed the fullest expansion of its former colonies. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund fall just short of directly blaming France for its monopolistic grip on these markets. As the need for a more economically competitive world becomes evident, the financial institutions are beginning to challenge France's role in its backyard." See also Kaye Whiteman, "France-Africa," 15, who contends that the powerful French-African business lobby, the beneficiaries of the high-value franc, were the principal opponents of devaluation. Through their power, they served as an "effective pressure group near the heart of government."


61. Keith Somerville, "Africa: Is There a Silver Lining," *Africa Today* 50, no. 11 (1994): 216; *West Africa*, 5 November 1990, 2773, also observes: "It is increasingly hard to find anywhere in the African continent...where a good word can be found for one-party rule. It is a disservice to Africans to suggest that this is simply because of the influence of Eastern Europe. Berlin and Bucharest simply showed what was possible, the disillusionment with a continent-wide leadership failure was already there, as was the strong feeling that one-partyism was being used as a front for self-perpetuating oligarchies."


80. Similar requests for the cancellation of $3.6 billion of debt and over $726 million in interest payments owed by ACP states was adamantly opposed by Germany and Britain, see Debra Percival, "Europe-Summit: ACP Debt Write-Off Tops Essen NGO Agenda," Inter Press Service Feature, 8 December 1994.


82. For a summary of the German position see Debra Percival, "Europe: Free Trade at Center of EU Third World Policy," Inter Press Service Feature, 8 January 1995; and for the European position see "Trade-Italy: African and Caribbean States Back Italian to Head WTO," Inter Press Service Feature, 30 November 1994.


84. Debra Percival, "Development: EU Ministers Set for Late Night Squabbles over ACP Aid," Inter Press Service Feature, 15 February 1995. French Foreign Minister Juppé pledged to continue to fight for a higher aid figure at future meetings, complaining: "I could not take responsibility for presenting a lowered aid package to the ACP ... It is simply not acceptable." See Barbara Borst, "Development-Africa: France Defends Aid Policy Against Critics," Inter Press Service Feature, 18 February 1995.


88. Ibid.


90. Ramesh Jaura, "Europe-Third World: EU Set to Improve Relations with the South," Inter Press Service Feature, 10 December 1994.

91. Sue Fleming, "Belgium-Africa," South African Press Association, 9 February 1995. Kohl's Germany has also slated post-apartheid South Africa for special attention due to its "strategic and political significance in the region," see Debra Percival, "Europe: Free Trade at Center of


95. Sithole, "Africa-Aid."


106. "Development: EC Considers Corps to Aid Democratization Process," *Inter Press Service Feature*, 25 November 1993. These efforts have been as wide-ranging as monitoring elections in Malawi, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania and providing funds for the training of parliamentarians in Mozambique.


119. Ibid.


123. A French research group, for instance, has estimated that about 82 percent of French income from arms sales between 1981 and 1990, some $27.5 billion, came from nonindustrialized countries: "We can say that what France gives as development aid to the Third World is recovered partly by the French military industry which sells the arms," it concludes in a report. See Angeline Oyog, "France-Africa: NGOs Call for Parliamentary Review of Arms Sales," *Inter Press Service Feature*, 5 September 1994.


127. Ibid.


130. One of the questions circulated to the candidates was: "Will you break off ties with African leaders who incite racial hatred to keep themselves in power?" See Angeline Oyog, "France-Politics: African Relations Highlighted in Presidential Race," *Inter Press Service Feature*, 8 December 1994.


132. Cited in Howard French, "Côte d'Ivoire: Closing a Chapter," 22. Note also that during the wave of West African civil pressure for democracy in 1990 Chirac declared that "Africans were not ready for democracy," cited in Mamadou Ndoye, "France-Africa: The Horse and the Jockey," 33.

