CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY AND OPPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: THE FRAMING PRACTICES OF PEACE MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

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Social movement organizations (SMOs) engage in the formation of public policy and social beliefs by framing issues and events for the public. These framing activities may offer an alternative source of knowledge and challenge status quo definitions of important social issues. Analyzing the statements and press releases of four peace movement organizations during the seven months of military escalation and war in the Persian Gulf in 1990 and 1991, this article explores the structure and content of social movement framing of a specific event. Findings suggest that the shape and content of the frames used by these SMOs are rooted in a complex amalgamation of each organization's historical and public identity, intended audiences, and contemporary motivations and organizational goals. The collective identity of an organization influences the shape and content of the organization's framing activities. The organizations studied made use of their specific structural and organizational strengths as part of a credentialing process, wherein they shaped their oppositional voices so they could be heard and accepted by specific audiences. This was in turn a matter of the organization's historical practice, the ways it presented that history, and how it constructed its con-

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temporary collective identity (e.g., as Quakers or as Catholic peacemakers). All of this is done with a view toward claiming a voice in the public debate, a voice that may help the SMO create oppositional bases of knowledge, influence public policy, sustain and embolden members, and establish a historical record of opposition.

The Persian Gulf War was fought in many places and with many weapons. On the domestic front in the United States, the weapons of choice were words, images, and frameworks of meaning. They were deployed by various parties to win the hearts and minds of the American populace. Saddam Hussein, the Kuwaiti government, the Bush administration, and the Pentagon all tried to frame the meaning of the Persian Gulf War in particular ways (Kriesberg 1992; Manheim 1993). Although other studies have documented and analyzed the framing activities of the above groups, no one has explored the framing processes employed by major U.S. peace movement organizations.

Goffman (1974) suggests that one of the many conceptual tools we use to make sense of events are frameworks, or “schemata of interpretation.” A framework so conceived allows its user to “locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (1974, p. 21). Put more simply, frames aid in the construction and interpretation of meaning; they help us to order—in both conscious and unconscious ways—our understanding of social events.

The framing concept has proven a useful tool for understanding how social movement organizations (SMOs) operate and engage participants in their efforts. Beginning with Snow et al.’s (1986) development of frame alignment processes, a series of papers has shown how consequential a variety of framing processes are to SMOs, and how useful the study of framing can be in understanding their social and political dynamics (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Melucci 1990; Gamson 1992; Tarrow 1992). However, much of the earliest work was conceptual and largely theoretical, with little or unclear empirical grounding.

Recent additions to the framing literature are more empirically based and have begun the important work of testing existing concepts while generating new theory based on original research (Johnston 1991; Coy 1992; Benford 1993; Hunt et al., 1994; Marullo et al. 1996; Jenness 1995; Zuo and Benford 1995). This study continues that trend; it was explicitly designed to be both empirically based and theory-generating.

The social and political activism of an organization (including its framing activities) is partly grounded in its collective identity. Taylor and Whittier define collective identity as the “shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity” (1992, p. 105). They argue that the development of a collective identity in a given social movement includes three processes: the creation of boundaries that separate a challenging group from the dominant society, increased consciousness of the structural dimensions of the group’s discontent and its critique of the dominant order, and the renegotiation of the political and symbolic dimensions of everyday life (Taylor and Whittier 1992). This argument suggests that framing is a critical part of the collective identity formation process (Hunt et al. 1994).

We have found that it is important to distinguish between the collective identity that is constructed within a peace movement organization, and the public collective identity that the organization conveys to society through its spokespersons, literature, and statements. The latter is always rooted in the former, but the amount of coherence between the two varies and is dependent on a number of factors, including: the amount of competition among organizational factions; the level of connection between the leadership and the constituents (Larana 1994, p. 220); the political culture surrounding the issues the SMO publicly speaks out on; the forms of public communication the SMO employs; and the level (local, national, international, transnational) at which the SMO organizes and operates.

Melucci (1992, p. 63) acknowledges that the framing and public communication processes of social movements serve to reveal and develop unity in collective identity and action, but he emphasizes that they ultimately obscure the plurality of positions that exist within the submerged networks of a movement. He argues for studying the interactions within the movement, where collective identity is constructed within the social relations of competing and complementary forces of a movement (Melucci 1988b, pp. 23–36). In her study of the women’s liberation movement, Carol Mueller (1994) persuasively argues that Melucci’s emphasis is most appropriate for the study of how groupings of people initially come together and develop a cultural analysis and a collective identity that may lead to the creation of formal organizations, which then organize for social and political change. When the organization attempts to influence public policy, its collective identity enters public discourse through press conferences, public statements, pro-
grams, and banners. At this stage, a new and wider set of social and political actors, what Klandermans (1992) calls a “multiorganizational field,” is engaged and interacted with. Carol Mueller (1994, p. 256) claims that the collective identities of movements achieve an “independent existence” when they publicly interact with these other social and political organizations. Our research shows, however, that an organization’s contemporary public collective identity is still tied to, constrained, and influenced by its historic collective identity, and that this has important ramifications for the public framing activities of the organization.

We analyze the framing processes of four SMOs during the Persian Gulf War along three distinct, but interrelated dimensions. Our first approach focuses on how SMOs projected their collective identity into their framing of the war. Here we pay particular attention to how organizations constructed and conveyed their public collective identity in an attempt to gain some advantages in what we call the “credentialing process.” Second, we assess the types of audiences toward which the framing processes were oriented, and we identify which audiences seemed to be emphasized by each organization. In identifying audiences we are highlighting the interactive nature of the social context of the framing activity; consequently, we suggest ways in which the intended audience may influence statement content. Third, we identify and analyze in a comparative fashion across the organizations what was being said within the framing process. We show how the organizations were creating what we call bases of “oppositional knowledge.”

This knowledge, we suggest, was created and conveyed by using oppositional frames to offer alternative accounts of the militarization of the Persian Gulf and the social meaning of the war.1

Our research suggests that SMOs engage in framing processes for a variety of reasons, and that the shape and content of the frames they use are rooted in a complex array of motivations and organizational goals. The motivations go beyond so-called “rational” and practical reasons, and the goals include much more then simply mobilizing organizational resources such as constituent support. Rather, we argue that the collective identity (construed as both historic and contemporary) of an organization influences the shape and content of the organization’s framing activities. Framing also acts to develop, maintain, and reinforce an organization’s public collective identity; it is both social process and cultural product. We show that the relationship between framing and identity construction, like that between micromobilization processes and identity construction (Hunt and Benford 1994, p. 511), is best understood as dialectical.

Although we identify interesting and potentially significant differences in how various groups framed an identical historical event, we did not do research to support claims as to which particular organization’s framing practices were most effective. Rather, we chose to analyze and name the structures that constituted their framing practices, partly because these framing practices were an important aspect of peace movement resistance during the Persian Gulf war. Our research also focused on the actual framing strategies of the organizations, including their attempts to provide an alternative interpretation of the military escalation and war. These alternative frames laid a basis for questioning U.S. actions, creating both a public dialogue and a historical record that would have looked much different otherwise. We agree with Dorothy Smith (1990, p. 11) that the very act of creating a discourse and finding a voice is a political act with consequences: “We make a new language that gives us speech, ways of knowing, ways of working politically. At the moment of separation from established discourses, the objectified forms of knowledge they embody become critically visible.” Thus the framing practices opened up political spaces2 for dissent and critique of otherwise accepted government actions in foreign policy, a not inconsequential accomplishment (Pagnucco and Smith 1993).

As social science researchers, we believe it important to state and reflect on our own social positions, both for insight into how they may influence our treatment of the data, and because our understanding of others and of larger social processes proceeds most profitably from within our own experiences (Ellis 1995, p. 89). Both authors were engaged in oppositional activities to the Persian Gulf Crisis. As a Quaker and a member of the Nonviolent Action Collective in Syracuse, NY, Lynne Woehrle organized a

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1 If and when social movements are successful in assimilating these oppositional bases of knowledge or new frames of meaning into the larger social context, substantive cultural change may occur (Tamrow 1992, p. 175).

2 For more on the notion of political space and the critical literature that has grown up around it, see the introduction to Evans and Boyte (1992), and Mellauci (1989b, pp. 227–232).
range of local community actions that promoted nonviolent approaches to resolving the conflict in the Gulf. Patrick Coy served as the national chairperson of the Fellowship of Reconciliation—USA during the War. He was a participant in that organization’s first delegation to Jordan and Iraq in October 1990, and was involved in most aspects of the organization’s oppositional activities. We are among the many activist/academics who attempt to move back and forth between the academy and social change movements in an integrated manner, allowing experiences in the one venue to inform our work in the other (Divinski et al. 1994, p. 6.). Whereas we strive for research outcomes that will build theory, we also hope to generate analysis that proves useful for activists in social movements.

**METHOD**

**Data Set**

The data for this study are official statements issued by four national peace movement organizations: the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), Pax Christi (PC), and SANE/Freeze (SF—Now known as Peace Action). The statements included were issued between the period of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (August 1990), and the cease-fire (February 1991). We also included statements from early March 1991 that address the cease-fire. The number of statements analyzed from each organization was as follows: AFSC = 17, FOR = 16, Pax Christi = 7, and SF = 9. Within these 49 documents (ranging from one to six pages in length) we found diverse and rich data, as well as recurring patterns of thought and argumentation, both within individual organizations and among organizations. The claims we make represent these four organizations, and only further research will show whether our analysis can be applied broadly to other SMOs.

**Organizations Included in the Study**

Although it is a free-standing organization, functioning independently of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), the pacifist American Friends Service Committee, founded in 1917, is the social action arm of the Quaker community. The Fellowship of Reconciliation—USA is an interfaith pacifist organization, also

founded in 1917. Pax Christi—USA, a national Catholic peace organization founded in 1972, is an overtly religious and sectarian organization of both pacifists and just war theorists. SANE/Freeze was formed in the mid-1980s through the merger of SANE and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign. It is a secular organization built on an antinuclear stance and not easily classified along pacifist/just war theory lines.

The range of peace and justice organizations represented in our data set was somewhat self-selecting. We would have preferred and did, in fact, aim for a more diverse set of organizations. We began by brainstorming a list of national SMOs that were publicly in opposition to the war. We chose seven of these (AFSC, FOR, PC, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Rainbow Coalition, the War Resisters League, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom) and contacted them by phone to request copies of relevant documents released between August 1990 and December 1991. We obtained documents from four of these organizations (AFSC, FOR, PC, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom). Wanting to add a secular and more diverse representation, we reapproached each of the nonrespondents, and also contacted three more groups (SF, Black Veterans for Social Justice, and the Military Families’ Support Network).

Aware that women have historically played a distinct role in social movements (Woehrle 1995), we hoped to create a gender analysis. Initially we included documents from the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, but we acquired only three relevant statements, not enough to stand alone as a solid comparative resource.3 We also wanted to compare the statements on other important social indicators such as race and class, but despite repeated attempts by phone and mail, sometimes through personal contacts within the organizations, we were unable to secure the statements of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Black Veterans for Social Justice, the Military Families Support Network, the Rainbow Coalition, and the War Resisters League. Without time and travel money to conduct archival

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3Other research (Cook-Huffman 1993; Woehrle 1993) suggests that gender socialization does affect social identity and the experience of social movement participation. Accumulating relevant data would be a useful extension of our current research.
research ourselves, we were left with the statements of those groups willing to use staff time to cooperate with our requests for material.

**Official Statements**

We defined “official statements” as press releases, printed statements, and public calls to action released from an organization’s national office, issued in the name of the organization as a whole, and released to the mainstream media. In the case of AFSC, we also included letters written by the organization to principal figures in the conflict (Saddam Hussein, George Bush, Boutros Boutros-Ghali), which were distributed to the media with a press release. We chose these statements because they represent the public voice of each organization and are the best record of the official positions taken by the organization.

Although similar studies of SMOs have profitably restricted their data to written materials (Williams 1995), to do so is not without problems. Not least among them is the fact that SMOs are often thought to be defined by their actions, not by their words. But events rely for their meaning at least partly on the discourses within which they occur, and movement actions were well represented in the documents. In fact, the documents were thick with representations and interpretations of movement activities and policy recommendations that were stood in contrast to government policies and broader cultural themes, what Gamson (1988) calls packages of cultural symbols.

We defined “official statements” as we did, and restricted our data to material meeting that definition, because we are primarily interested in the public framing practices employed by the organizations. When peace movement organizations issue official statements and press releases during times of war they may be trying to influence governmental policy, establish their position for the historical record, or shape the thinking of their immediate constituency and of the nation as a whole. They deliberately and overtly frame issues and themselves in specific ways to facilitate acceptance of their argument and their positions regarding the war, to establish their credibility in the public debate, to amplify movement values and beliefs, and to motivate members, both current and potential.

A comparative analysis across the terrain of organizations is necessary because, although peace movement organizations hold many positions and ideologies in common, they also harbor significant differences. Indeed, the founding of some organizations is rooted in these often splintering differences, and organizations even use them as a means of recruitment. Nevertheless, it is possible to collapse these often disparate differences into smaller groupings of meaningful categories. We analyze the differences in terms of how each organization constructed its public identity relative to its intended audiences, and the similarities in terms of how they reframed the status quo stories about the war.

The myriad demands and pressures experienced by a society at war help stand the values of competing social groups in high relief. Government policy choices that in peacetime arouse only passing interest are subjected to intense scrutiny and reinterpretation. The framing processes employed in the official statements of movement organizations is actually part of an elaborate struggle between competing social forces (government, social movement organizations, public figures, and media institutions) for influence on how individual citizens and other social institutions think about the war. This process should be seen as part of the larger function that social movements play in contemporary society, namely the construction of new meaning systems that highlight existing conflicts and emerging issues in society (Snow and Benford 1988). Moreover, these official statements are the products of an interactive process within each organization wherein various factions and interests contend with each other in the production of a unified public voice for the organization. Thus framing is not static but changes with the organization and in response to changing social conditions (e.g., national policies).

Looked at in this interpretive light, social movement organization statements and the framing processes they represent take on

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4 Research based on the official statements of organizations is often greeted with skepticism in the social sciences. This skepticism is partly because of researchers taking organizational statements at their face value. We think that skepticism is often warranted. However, the organizational public posturing that is problematic for certain kinds of research is not so here; in fact it is the focus of our study.

5 There is, for example, solid evidence that the framing efforts of the 20th-century U.S. peace movement can be usefully reduced to three main categories of orientation: great powers, world order, and nonviolence (Marullo et al. 1996). Of course significant differences exist amongst those three approaches, and it remains true that unified and consensual frames are seldom achieved across a movement's field of organizations (Benford 1993; Gamson and Meyer 1996).
added research significance. We are interested in the posturing and framing processes for what they can tell us about social movement organizations and the ways they insert their voices into public debates, raise issues, and attempt to mobilize adherents.

Coding and Analysis

The source material was either scanned into a computer word processing program or typed in by hand. We divided the source material between us, each taking primary coding responsibility for the data for two organizations.\(^6\) We coded the statements inductively, by reading and rereading, searching for words and concepts that reflected what we perceived in the documents. Most of the wording for the codes emerged from the text; but in some cases we developed phrases that reflected larger concepts. We then read the documents again, adding new codes, collapsing especially narrow ones and renaming still others to create a more global coding pattern. As we each developed a code, we also defined it to allow for cross-coder comparisons. Instead of working with a preset list of coding categories, we coded widely, spoke to each other frequently by phone, and then met twice to compare and standardize our work, and to collapse, expand, and redefine our coding as appropriate. After a final rereading of each set of source materials we ended up with just over 50 codes.\(^7\)

We coded the statements using the HyperResearch qualitative analysis program, which helped us mark in the text patterns of ideas and language, allowed us to compare the numbers of occurrences of a particular code, and assisted us in extracting exemplary statements. Once everything was coded, we each worked with an identical copy of the entire study and used the computer program to run sets of codes that we believed might reveal patterns in the data. We also used the computer analysis program to test observations we made about the data during the coding process.

There is little doubt that our individual affiliations with the peace movement shaped our coding practices. Patrick Coy’s former position as national chair of the FOR and his involvement in the drafting of some of the FOR statements under study provided

useful insights into the coding and analysis of the data. Lynne Woehrle’s background in Quakerism and participation in local actions further helped extrude our analysis. We were also aided by discussions with a colleague who was on the PC staff during the Persian Gulf War. We believe that our personal knowledge of these organizations enriched our coding strategy, especially in the latter stages of refining the codes, and increased our understanding of the complexities of the framing activities.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC COLLECTIVE IDENTITY: ESTABLISHING CREDENTIALS

Our research suggests that framing activities are related to and directed at particular populations. But because we focus on press releases rather than on other means of publicity (e.g., direct mail campaigns, newsletters, flyers, posters), we are getting a particular piece of the framing activities of SMOs. Our analysis must be seen within the particular focus of the data.

As oppositional groups in a social order, SMOs are at a distinct disadvantage. Movement-generated discourse represents only a tiny fraction of the overall discourse that movement adherents are exposed to, and even less for the average citizen and potential participant that the SMO desires to reach (Gamson 1988, p. 224). The mainstream media are of course a major source of information for most citizens, with much of the content influenced or slanted by the established legitimating frames. So rare is the occasion of a SMO breaking through into the mainstream media and articulating its alternative, action-oriented frame that many SMOs rely on theatrical and publicity-generating tactics in their activism. An even greater rarity is the challenger who successfully forces the sponsors of a legitimating frame to defend its underlying assumptions (Gamson 1992).

Sometimes significant social events like elections or national tragedies may result in the temporary cracking of the hegemonic grip that government and corporate voices enjoy in the mainstream media, but this is generally not the case with wars. During the Persian Gulf War, the major media outlets essentially served Bush administration interests in advocating for the war (J. Mueller 1994, pp. 74–75). Moreover, voices from outside mainstream institutions found it almost impossible to gain access on network

\(^6\)We also did a preliminary coding of the WILPF data but found the data set was too small to be of use.

\(^7\)For a full listing of the codes, broken down by frequency of use for each organization, please contact the authors.
television to offer alternative views.\(^8\) When the peace movement activities and members did make it on the evening news, they were often treated as unpatriotic loners and as "deviant rebels." These few reports were contrasted with frequent and much longer reports about "normal" or "typical" Americans who supported the war (Allen et al. 1994, pp. 271–277).\(^9\) Further exacerbating this approach was the media's tendency to package reports on demonstrations around the theme of protest as a form of expression, leaving little room for peace movement critiques of policy (Dobkin 1993, pp. 118–119).

The specific question of mainstream media access aside, the foreign policy arena is generally the most difficult area for SMOs to gain access to and influence policy formulation in (Pagnucco and Smith 1993).\(^10\) The relatively few nongovernmental groups that gain influence here tend to be dominated by former government figures and current representatives from the business community. In summary, SMOs face the dual challenge of gaining access and of having their views taken seriously in the formulation of policy.

**Credentialed Process**

The primary way the SMOs responded to this problem in the statements we analyzed was to spill considerable ink on what we call the "credentialing process." In general terms, both the FOR and AFSC took a longevity approach, frequently emphasizing, or prefacing and concluding their statements by pointing out that they were well established organizations that had been speaking out on peace and justice issues for more than 70 years. AFSC offered further historical details by twice noting that it received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947, and had worked in the Middle East since 1948. More specifically, FOR and AFSC also tried to credential their voices and increase their status as legitimate players by highlighting the humanitarian aid the respective organizations were raising and delivering to the region. The FOR in particular utilized this tactic, repeatedly referring to the firsthand knowledge that their humanitarian and peacemaking delegations had gained.\(^11\)

The three faith-based organizations in the study (AFSC, FOR, and PC) consistently placed their religious orientation front and center:

> The Testimony of peace, which springs from the Quaker tradition and has always been a hallmark of the work of the AFSC, is rooted in a belief in the dignity of each person and the potential of each person to turn towards the Light. We believe that each of these two leaders shares in that potential and can choose policies of peace rather than war—even at this late date. (AFSC 1/15/91)

> The FOR delegation includes a cross section of U.S. citizens—Christian, Jewish and Muslim—who are traveling to Iraq to urge a peaceful resolution to the crisis in the Gulf. (FOR 11/21/90b)

> As followers of Jesus, we are compelled to raise our voices and to act in protest. We pledge to resist this war, to join with others in nonviolent demonstrations, vigils and acts of civil disobedience. (PC 1/17/91)

FOR employed a series of variations on the theme of being an interfaith pacifist organization, a ministry of reconciliation, and an organization that seeks "to apply the power of truth and love to the resolution of human conflicts" (FOR 10/90). When AFSC and PC recommended specific policies or oppositional activities, they

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\(^8\) Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting's (FAIR) studies revealed that during the month of August, 1990, not a single guest on ABC's "Nightline" program argued against U.S. military intervention (Greene et al. 1990, p. 4). A FAIR survey of the sources on the ABC, CBS, and NBC nightly news found that of 878 on-air sources, only one was a representative of a national peace organization. Antiwar voices were largely relegated to sound bytes at demonstrations; but even here only about 1.5% of network sources were protesters, about the same number as sources asked about how the war had affected their travel plans (Naureckas 1991, p. 5).

\(^9\) Examination of CNN and NBC coverage by Allen et al. (1994) suggests that under-reporting and negative framing of the protest movement, coupled with the near continuous reporting and positive framing of the administration's war efforts, created a "spiral of silence" in public opinion that made it very difficult for individual Americans to dissent and that contributed to a prolonged "consensus" of support for the war.

\(^10\) To recognize the odds that U.S. peace movements must overcome to influence American foreign policy is not to claim that they have consistently failed to gain influence. They have, in fact, done so on numerous occasions. For an especially useful structural analysis, see Meyer (1993).

\(^11\) Because we were analyzing official statements and press releases, it was only natural that FOR's delegations would be referred to disproportionately because of the many press releases they issued on the departure and return of their frequent delegations. But FOR also consistently featured the delegations in their more general official statements. For an analysis of the "track two" diplomacy of the FOR's delegations see Coy (1991) and Rupert (unpublished).
tended to make religious identity claims and to place themselves overtly within specific cultural groupings. AFSC frequently presented itself as a Quaker organization and explained that it therefore saw “each life as sacred,” and each person as a “child of God.” It noted that the “testimony of peace” was a historic “hallmark of the Quaker tradition.” PC offered the literal translation of its name (“Peace of Christ”) to describe itself and noted that it was a “community of faith.”

PC tended to highlight a different aspect of its self-definition to gain credibility with the specific audience to which a statement seemed to be primarily addressed. When recommending collective action that employed traditionally religious forms of resistance like fasting and public prayer vigils, PC began its paragraphs and sentences with these formulations: “As a community of faith . . .” “As followers of Jesus . . .” “As Catholics . . .” “As the Catholic peace movement . . .” Here PC tended to use invitational verbs such as “we ask, we invite, we plead, we encourage . . .” But when addressing constitutional issues, or when a statement was more clearly directed to the Congress, the Bush administration, and the general public, PC relied on its citizenship identity, prefacing its remarks with, “As US citizens . . .” “As members of a democratic society . . .” “As people of good will . . .” And here PC was more likely to use action verbs with an edge, such as “we demand . . .”

What SF emphasized was its membership size. It boasted of 150,000 mobilizable adherents in 240 organized chapters spread across 30 states. More specifically, SF claimed that thousands of its members were mobilized to flood more than 120 congressional offices with letters urging a no vote for war (SF 11/16/90). SANE/Freeze’s recent organizational history was a bit more complicated than that of the other groups. It was born of a 1987 merger between SANE (The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy), founded in the 1950s, and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, founded in the 1980s. This history is the likely reason that, despite SANE’s having been a major SMO with unusually high credibility for over 40 years, SF did not rely on its historical legacy to gain credibility.

PUBLIC IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

As the crisis wore on and the war actually commenced, each group gave increasing amounts of its public identity definition efforts over to chronicling the statements already issued, the positions taken, and the oppositional activities organized by the group throughout the move toward war. They generally prefaced new positions and statements with records of past ones. The articulation of this immediate history was a way for the SMOs to claim to have been at the public discourse and policy table from the beginning of the conflict, and to ensure their place there in the present. Sometimes, as in a PC document, the groups displayed a certain weariness: “Time and again in recent months, we have rejected the ominous march toward war” (PC 1/17/91).

The construction of a public collective identity is always an interactive process, involving both the individuals in the group and other groupings, of nonmembers (Melucci 1989a, p. 342). Taylor and Whittier (1992) show how organizations develop social and psychological structures they call “boundaries” to establish differences. In the SMO world, collective identity claims are often made vis-à-vis other SMOs; to highlight the differences is to claim a particular identity and perhaps increased social standing. Occasionally organizations may criticize or even directly attack rival groups. More often this is done in a less direct, but still competitive fashion, with an SMO claiming leadership or unique initiation in a specific field of action. Two groups in our study employed this technique.

The FOR, for example, sought to position itself as both a historical and a current leader amongst SMOs by claiming it had been “a leading force for peace and social justice since 1915, and was a key player in every major peace and justice initiative . . .” (FOR 10/17/90). FOR also twice claimed it was “in the forefront of the war prevention movement since it sent the first delegation of US citizens to Iraq in October” (FOR 12/7/90). It further boasted that that delegation was the “first American peace group to receive permission to enter Iraq” and that “its call for a nonviolent settlement received wide attention” (FOR 11/21/90a). FOR was the only group to include laudatory statements by prominent people about the group’s work. Although to a much less degree than FOR, SF also engaged in competitive identity claims-making. It laid claim to being the “largest grassroots peace and justice organization” (SF 11/16/90).

Each of the groups apparently wanted to be recognized as even-handed and able to deliver critical analysis of the parties involved in the conflict. AFSC, FOR, and PC each used the strongest diplomatic language possible by “condemning” Iraq’s inva-
sion of Kuwait, and each did so frequently. SF, in contrast, found the invasion only “sad.” AFSC took pains to note that it had written letters to both George Bush and Saddam Hussein, had held vigils at both the White House and the Iraqi embassy, and had attempted “to speak the truth as we understand it to both sides.” In this regard FOR pointed to the series of peace delegations it had organized to Jordan and Iraq, noting that they had openly rejected Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and had encouraged the Iraqis to withdraw and to release the Western hostages then being held by Iraq.

The FOR actually relied quite heavily on their peace delegations and their delivery of humanitarian aid to gain credibility and standing in the debate. FOR also organized a high-profile campaign involving thousands of citizens sending empty film canisters to President Bush, the leader of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House. Made to look like oil barrels, the black canisters were adorned with the stark message, “No Blood for Oil.” Although it was precisely the sort of publicity-generating tactic often used by SMOs, the FOR never mentioned it in its statements, preferring to focus instead on the more credentialing tactics of citizen peace and fact-finding delegations to Iraq.

THE ROLE OF AUDIENCES IN FRAMING ACTIVITIES

Our research suggests that the audience to whom framing activity is aimed influences the framing work done by a SMO. This interactionist view sees framing as an active rather than a static process, one that changes over time because of the influence of membership, organizational dynamics, and historical events.

The documents reveal that one of the motivations of these SMOs to frame or reframe the war was a sense of responsibility to inform certain audiences. In the organizations we studied, this ranged from “the people,” to the group’s membership, to state leaders, to the United Nations (U.N.). At times this sense of responsibility to reach people about the war had a clear moral edge to it. It also appeared to be rooted in an organization’s awareness of its historic mandate and traditional modus operandi:

Since 1915, the Fellowship of Reconciliation has advocated nonviolent alternatives to armed conflict and promoted reconciling methods to overcome hatred and bigotry. The crisis in the Persian Gulf challenges us once again to summon our faith and speak truth to power. (FOR 8/30/90)

In the establishment of a public collective identity we notice that there are multiple levels of audience, beyond the membership, toward whom the framing is aimed. These multiple audiences are evident in analyzing the data set as a whole or by organization, and sometimes in individual press releases. They also operate to influence and construct an SMO’s presentation of its organizational identity and its framing of specific events (Hunt et al. 1994, p. 203). The intended audiences we inferred from the statements include those who support, are neutral toward, and may disagree with the frames set forth by the SMOs, as well as the inanimate audience of history.12

In what follows we identify four broad audience types (beyond the membership) for the SMO statements. We also show the different emphases placed on these various audiences by specific SMOs and discuss the ways these emphases interacted with the content of the statements.

Stopping the War

We infer from the content of these statements that they were aimed at those who the SMO believes have agency to stop the war. Included in this category is a continuum of actors from the individual citizen, to the state leader, to the U.N. The glue that holds this category together is the SMO’s belief that this audience (a) can be influenced by the SMO, and (b) can take action to influence a nonviolent settlement to the conflict. These are the people whom the SMO believes it has the power to speak to and who are in a position to do something about the war. Therefore, the makeup of this audience relates to and is heavily influenced by the organization’s public identity.

For example, the AFSC, an organization with strong interna-

12This is a different use of the term “audience” from that of Hunt et al. (1994). They reserve “audience” for nonmembers thought to be neutral or uncommitted to the group’s cause and who may react to or report on movement activities (Hunt et al. 1994, p. 199). We are discussing “audience” as all people likely to receive the framing statements, including the membership, whether or not they are likely to be supportive of them or persuaded by them.
tional ties and programs, emphasized that the U.N. rather than the U.S. should be responding to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait:

We believe [U.S. and Western military intervention] serves to escalate the dangers of conflict, to increase polarization and instability in the region, and to make the underlying Middle Eastern conflicts more difficult. It weakens the United Nations as an effective instrument of international order and renews the self-appointed role of the United States as the world’s policeman. . . . We believe that the first order of business should be to halt the build-up of U.S. forces and give the U.N.-sponsored economic embargo time to take effect. (AFSC 9/4/90)

Moreover, unlike other groups in our study, the AFSC aimed its statements and letters toward the U.S. government, demanding less unilateral action; toward Saddam Hussein, demanding a cessation of hostilities; and toward influential members in the U.N., encouraging more responsive action and leadership by that international body.

SF, with a long history of advocacy in Congress, focused on the responsibility of Congress to keep the U.S. out of war:

The decision to go to war—to kill and die—is the most fundamentally important decision any society can make. Yet the U.S. Congress continues to refuse to debate the issue publicly, thus allowing the Bush Administration to get us closer to war every day. (SF 1/7/91)

As part of its opposition, SF called on Congressional representatives to take action to stop the war and to debate the issues publicly. They also encouraged citizens to lobby their representatives, arguing that participation is a right of citizenship that should be practiced.

The FOR tended to aim its press statements toward local peace groups, religious communities, and individuals, inviting them to get involved in stopping the war. It called for nationally coordinated local actions, “urging [Bush and Congress] to immediately withdraw all nuclear weapons from the Gulf region,” and “vigils and demonstrations in public places to raise awareness on the dangers of nuclear weapons in the Gulf,” as well as “letters to the editor and organizing teach-ins and community forums on the issue” (FOR 11/29/90).

PC’s focus was the Catholic peace movement and the larger liberal Catholic community. Consequently, PC emphasized the personal responsibility of each Christian to act to stop the war, a war PC judged clearly unjust. Many of their press releases carried a clear moral edge that implied a narrower audience, one based more on religious commitment than on political participation or foreign policy intervention:

As followers of Jesus, Pax Christi holds that all human life is sacred and that all war is contrary to the message of Jesus who commands that we love our enemies and challenges us all to be peacemakers. (PC 11/29/90)

PC framed the war for those whose Christian, and specifically Catholic, beliefs made it possible for them to follow the logic of the SMO’s account.

Thus a group’s public collective identity regulated the audience they attempted to influence. The breakdown looks like this:

- PC: Catholics, Catholic church officials, the Christian community;
- FOR: the peace movement, the interfaith community, the U.N.;
- SF: Congress, the Bush administration, voters; and
- AFSC: the Quaker community, the U.N., the Bush administration, Saddam Hussein.

This schema shows that if a macro view of the antiwar movement is taken, the SMOs we analyze addressed a continuum of actors from the local to the international.

In the early going, each organization addressed those who it thought had the responsibility and agency to negotiate an agreement; later on, they tended to focus on those who they thought could stop the war. We suggest that the specific choices each SMO made regarding audience selection depended upon a number of factors. The choices related to an SMO’s conception of its own power and to how much agency it attributed to individuals, to individuals in groups, and to political leaders. Thus those who are generally associated with the power to stop the war (state leaders) were conflated with individuals. The latter, according to PC, SF, and the FOR, were potentially influential in stopping the war.
Reaching the Media

An additional category of audience for the framing work of the SMOs, the mainstream media are traditional consumers of press releases. The desire to attract the media’s attention probably influenced the tone and style of the statements as well as their content. The media as audience influenced the statements more in terms of what was left out than what was put in. For example, we found surprisingly little critique in the documents of the media and their role in defining the war, despite the fact that peace movement critiques of the media’s treatment of the war were common at the time. The only exception in our data was the FOR, which took the media to task for dealing with the issue in isolation from broader, relevant contexts, and accused the media and the administration of having “irresponsibly manipulated racial and ethnic stereotypes to build support for military actions” (FOR 8/30/90). Still, the FOR critiques were the exception and not the rule. We think these omissions are related to the SMO’s hoping that the mainstream media would carry and report on their press releases and oppositional activities, perhaps resulting in a form of self-censorship.

Creating Historical Records

Both our own personal experiences and our data suggest that the historical record was deemed a worthy audience. That SMOs also write their statements for history is indicated by their frequent use of such phrases as, “We are already on record as opposing . . .” and by the issuing of annotated listings of a group’s statements and oppositional activities. Put simply, when the history of a war is written, peace movement organizations are apparently keen to have the record show the oppositional stances they took:

SANE/Freeze has been organizing opposition to a military solution to the Gulf Crisis since the very beginning of the U.S. buildup there. (SF 11/16/90)

In harmony with the historic peace testimony of the Religious Society of Friends, and out of grave concern for the lives of the men, women and children who would be the victims of a war in the Middle East, the Corporation of the American Friends Service Committee in its annual meeting November 17, 1990, urges

President George Bush and Congress to put their utmost reliance on negotiation and diplomacy. (AFSC 11/17/90)

But we believe there are other factors at work here as well. As suggested in the previous discussion of organizational collective identity, the creation of legitimacy to speak out on a topic involves the organization in a credentialing process. Moreover, organizations honor their historic identity with contemporary actions and positions that they hope are consistent and complementary to that identity. They also like to make public note of these parallels. The nurturance and presentation of a consistent historic identity appears important to sustaining individual organizations over the long term, and perhaps even the larger movement.

Mobilizing New Members

The potential adherent or participant is an audience category that much social movement theorizing would assume was present in the documents we studied. The resource mobilization approach to framing, for example, has tended to emphasize the importance of convincing individuals of the likely successes of peace movement campaigns to get them involved. Indeed, Snow et al. claim that “much of the micro mobilization activity engaged in by peace activists involves the amplification of beliefs regarding the efficacy of their campaigns” (1986, p. 471). SMO culture often includes the belief that there is always one more person out there to be reached, informed, and convinced. Consequently, the audience for these widely issued press releases presumably included future members who might strengthen and build the organization and the wider movement.

Whereas this type of audience is indeed a target of the SMO’s framing activities, our data suggest it was not a significant factor in the example of the Persian Gulf War. We found that, at least for those SMOs that have a strong religious orientation (PC, FOR, and AFSC), the statements are nearly devoid of attempts to amplify the “efficacy of action” belief. What we discovered instead, especially in the cases of PC and FOR, was an emphasis on the importance of standing up for one’s beliefs and of being faithful to the

\[13\] Our findings are congruent with those of Swank (1993-1994), who found that peace movement participation in San Diego during the Persian Gulf War did not hinge on a high sense of movement power or efficacy.
values of one’s traditions, whether or not it was politically expedient or effective. Although it is possible that the organizations taking this approach hoped to gain some new recruits through the example of moral rectitude, we think that this finding suggests that one of the intended audiences was the already convinced (the membership and the like-minded public); the statements were more a message to that audience than an effort to reach and persuade others.

The multiple audiences for the statements interacted in still other ways with the content. We noticed, for example, that the statements varied in tone and content from group to group. We theorize that the language and tone of the discourse they used related to how they defined their audience and to what they hoped to accomplish. In other words, they had to speak in a way that would be heard by those they were trying to influence (Hunt et al. 1994, p. 200). We read the following tonalities in the various statements (all similar kinds of statements: press releases):

- PC: Catholic-centric, morally judgmental, inspirational, harsh, action-oriented;
- FOR: moderate, interfaith, invitational, urgent, action-oriented;
- SF: diplomatic, nonblaming; and
- AFSC: moderate, invitational.

Thus, AFSC tended to request or invite its audience (U.N. members, Hussein, Bush) to see the potential for good in the adversary and to behave in ways to promote a nonviolent resolution of the conflict. PC, on the other hand, told its audience (membership, mainly Catholics) that there were grave moral issues involved for each of them and that as Catholic Christians they had a responsibility to act for peace. The choice of the audience determined not only who was targeted and what was asked, but also how it was asked. Audience influences framing because it helps define the purpose behind the content, the form, and the direction of framing statements. Discovering the multiple audiences of these SMOs provides a better understanding of how complex the framing process can be and why different organizations frame the same event in noticeably different ways.

To summarize this section, we can say that organizations try to support those who are already convinced and committed to the movement’s goals by providing alternative information and accounts of events, and by cajoling their adherents to do more. Reaching and influencing those who are believed to have the power to create change (in this case broker a settlement and/or stop the war) also affects the direction and the content of these public statements. Who is included in this cohort, however, differs across organizations given their specific mandates and organizational histories, and these factors, in turn, clearly influence the tone of the documents. The media are also a natural audience for these press releases, thus influencing the language and style of the statements, and determining who is and, as we argued above, who is not critiqued. These documents further demonstrate that fashioning a historical record of SMO positions and activities is one of the functions of “official statements” issued in times of national crisis. This construction of a historical record also suggests an SMO interest in contributing to long-term cultural change, and the presence of goals that go beyond the immediate objective of stopping the war.

We now turn to the third important component in the framing activity: the telling of alternative accounts of the event and the production of oppositional knowledge.

# Framing and the Production of Oppositional Knowledge

The social constructionist approach to understanding society suggests that, although broad patterns may be discerned, reality is largely subjective and influenced by one’s social location. The social constructionist approach to SMOs also contextualizes events in history, seeing social movements as processes in formation. This holds true not only for movement events, but for the communicative interactions and “cognitive praxis” SMOs engage in to produce knowledge (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, pp. 46–49, 59). Here we find the meaning of movements and their collective identity as much in what they think and how they frame their thinking as in what they do.

Over time, framing by SMOs creates a base of what we call “oppositional knowledge.” This is accomplished by presenting alternative accounts containing additional and different information about situations from the status quo or power elite versions. Influenced by the SMO’s social location, the framing of this oppositional knowledge helps create congenial climates of shared
belief. In the present case, the SMO statements highlighted those values and beliefs that had high saliency within groups, which often stand in marked contrast to the "condensing symbols" (Gam-son 1988) that distill the values of the larger political culture. This "ideological focusing" has a highly integrative function within the group and occurs through the use of catch words that enjoy high consensus values in the organization and movement (Downton and Wehr 1991; Melucci 1990). Perhaps more importantly, beyond the group it can contribute new perspectives and influence social knowledge in formative ways (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, pp. 48–49).

The ability to frame events and to disseminate the resulting frames is a matter of social power. In times of war and international crisis, oppositional knowledge resources increase in significance given the mainstream media's adherence to norms of the nation-state and its defense of the status quo (Mowlana 1992). Television news viewing during the Persian Gulf Crisis and War, for example, confused the viewer rather than clarified basic facts (Morgan et al. 1992), and increased the likelihood that the public's and the Bush administration's understandings of the conflict would be congruent (Iyengar and Simon 1994). We have shown that the four SMOs under study took varying approaches to making themselves viable participants in the discussions and debates over the Persian Gulf War and U.S. involvement. The production and dissemination of press releases and official statements were an attempt to decenter the framing of the war produced by the government and mainstream media.

We employed the concept of framing to help us analyze the process of creating an oppositional stance about the Persian Gulf War. In the following sections we explore more closely four major dimensions of the oppositional knowledge regarding the war that the organizations used to frame it for their particular audiences. Our typology includes: (a) critiques of leadership and discussion of alternatives, (b) placement of responsibility for the war, (c) structural critiques of the war's meaning and causes, and (d) costs of the war.

Although we do not emphasize the changes in content and tone that we observed over time, our categories should be seen as fluid and shifting. Early frames focused more on encouraging patience and negotiations while avoiding escalation. As hostilities became imminent, the frames adopted a warning tone, emphasizing what resorting to war would really mean and how mistaken it would be to overlook alternatives. Finally, as the bombing and invasion ensued, the tone became more condemning. The statements turned to highlighting the missed opportunities and alternatives while making even more detailed claims as to the wider human and environmental impact and costs of the war.

**Critiques of Leadership and Discussion of Alternative Solutions**

Part of the oppositional knowledge provided by these organizations to their audiences early on was the idea that the war was not necessary and that a peaceful solution would be possible if leaders had the will and patience to use negotiations and embargoes to their fullest extent:

Without active efforts at good faith negotiations between all parties, our military show of force may cause the very thing it is meant to deter: a war. Drawing lines in the sand and issuing ultimatums and public lectures are poor substitutes for negotiations. (PC 8/22/90)

Genuine negotiations, not war ultimatums, can produce a settlement in the Gulf Crisis. . . . U.S. forces should be replaced by U.N. forces, and disputes should be settled by the World Court or the League of Arab states. The U.N. should not become a cover for war. (SF 11/30/90)

In early documents governmental leaders were praised for initially seeking a negotiated settlement. But as the crisis deepened and the war began, the national leadership of the U.S. and Iraq, and the international leadership of the U.N. were each taken to task for hurrying through the nonviolent alternatives and relying too quickly on war, ignoring the problems that attend it as a solution.

As the months passed and the U.S. took what the organizations perceived as an increasingly belligerent stand, the SMOs countered by arguing that economic sanctions were not being given ample time to work effectively and that negotiations were still feasible and should be pursued further. As the military buildup proceeded, the statements turned increasingly critical of national and international leadership. Once the military alternative was chosen and the bombs began to fall, the U.S. was reprimanded by
each of the organizations for acting unilaterally. Particularly concerned with the unilateral action were the FOR and AFSC, whose repetition of their critiques of unilateralism showed they were deeply committed to the idea that this dispute should be handled through an international organization like the U.N.

A core assumption in the framing practices of these organizations was that nonviolent alternatives had not been explored or exploited sufficiently, especially the increased use of sanctions. At the heart of this alternative was the oft-repeated idea that the U.S. should allow the international community to take the lead and act in concert through globally enforced sanctions to stop the unwanted aggression (i.e., Iraq's invasion of Kuwait):

Despite the promising outcome to their early economic and diplomatic initiatives, President Bush and his advisors did not accept international diplomatic action as sufficient, and without a U.N. mandate they added a military component to enforce the economic sanctions and forestall any possible Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. (AFSC 9/4/90)

The international consensus supporting a wide-ranging economic and financial embargo of Iraq and occupied Kuwait is unprecedented, but it requires time to work. The deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia and the recent U.N. Security Council decision sanctioning the limited use of force to enforce the embargo exacerbates, rather than relieves, the crisis. While the intervention of Secretary General Perez de Cueller is a welcome sign that diplomatic solutions will be pursued, unilateral U.S. actions must cease. (FOR 8/30/90)

These organizations also framed the issues in a manner that highlighted to the public that not only were there alternatives to war, but that the Bush administration was wrong to act unilaterally and belligerently by choosing the military option. The insistence of the U.S. that it lead a military response was seen as counterproductive, egocentric, and smacking of international grandstanding. Moreover, the U.S. was criticized for having a narrow view of the possible options and little commitment to finding nonviolent solutions.

Besides the argument that nonviolent alternatives were still possible and had not been given an adequate chance, two other primary reasons were given for opposing the invasion and the use of direct violence. The war and invasion were framed by SF as unacceptable for constitutional reasons. Congress, the group explained clearly, is the body that has the power to declare war, and thus President Bush was circumventing the appropriate democratic process. Also stressed was the SMO's belief that the general public did not want a war, and that the President was acting without a national consensus. This, it was argued, was unacceptable. A second argument was that in this case there were religious limitations on the just use of war. PC argued that the war could not be justified because nonviolent options were not exhausted and the war's likely consequences would violate still other criteria of the just war theory.

**Placement of Responsibility for the War**

One clear intention of these organizations was to establish who was responsible for the war. The answer varied from group to group, and they did not hesitate to indict fellow citizens and their own membership. Responsibility went beyond the seemingly rash unilateral actions by Iraq and then the U.S.; responsible parties included those who escalated the conflict and those who did not act sufficiently to stop the war. Who was the focus of blame differed across organizations, and it appeared heavily influenced by whom the group saw as the audience for its framing activities.

At a general level, there are some similarities to the observations in the previous section; once again the overall theme here is that the actual outbreak of fighting was the fault of the U.S. Although Iraq had been condemned in the earlier statements for belligerent behavior and unwillingness to negotiate a peaceful solution (August and September, 1990), as negotiations failed the U.S. was increasingly the one accused of acting too quickly and unilaterally.

For example, the AFSC told a story of negotiations gone wrong because they were hurried. The U.S. was represented as egotistic and accused of wanting to dominate world politics, to be the world's policeman:

"We were somewhat surprised that this argument did not hinge on a "no more Vietnamese" statement in these documents, the way it was often framed at peace movement demonstrations. For an illuminating analysis of the ways that the false memory of Vietnam-era protestor-troop antagonisms hamstrung the opposition to the Gulf War, see Beamish et al. (1995)."
But here at home a macho climate dies hard, and the belief that the United States has the right to control the terms of its access to Middle Eastern oil remains a cornerstone of national policy. Despite the promising outcome to their early economic and diplomatic initiatives, President Bush and his advisors did not accept international diplomatic action as sufficient . . . (AFSC 9/4/90)

SF also portrayed the U.S. as impatient, saying: “What President Bush described as the ‘last, extra mile for peace’ should have been a first step.” (SF 1/9/91) In other documents, SF placed the responsibility for the war on Congress for its failure to take a strong stand against the rush to war, and on Bush for acting unconstitutionally. In this view, improper process had subverted democracy, because there would not have been a war if public opinion had been taken seriously (SF 10/24/90).

The militarized approach to U.S. foreign policy was critiqued by the FOR, which argued that military weapons were unnecessary to solve the conflict. Moreover, the FOR suggested that the U.S. government and media had intentionally “manipulated racial and ethnic stereotypes” to rationalize and excuse the war (FOR 8/30/90). Thus, they should have been held responsible for telling a false story and dampening mass opposition to the war.

PC and the FOR, the two organizations that appeared to aim their statements to a significant degree at their membership, held the individual responsible to speak out and take action. Failure to join in actions to stop the war made the individual partially responsible for the turn of the conflict to violence. Members were told emphatically that their opposition was necessary and a matter of personal responsibility:

No matter what actions are taken by other governments, we cannot, as a people committed to ethical and international standards, acquiesce in any military action that would compromise our moral integrity. Nor can we allow the winds of war ominously stirring in our land to silence the voice of moral responsibility required of peoples who pride themselves on the rights of citizen participation. (PC 8/22/90)

PC insisted that individual Catholics were morally bound to criticize the war on just war or pacifist grounds and that they were obligated to oppose the war.

Whether the SMO held international or national bodies, individuals or governments responsible, an overriding theme prevailed in the statements: that impatience, and macho and racist attitudes in the government and the culture, coupled with the lack of an adequate citizen’s opposition to war, were at fault for the U.S. unilateral actions. Naming specific U.S. parties as responsible was a way to tell an alternative story about the crisis and how it became a war, especially because the dominant story tended to posit primary responsibility in a Hitleresque version of Saddam Hussein.15

Structural Critiques of the War’s Meaning and Causes

A third dimension of the oppositional knowledge created about the Persian Gulf War included the stories told to place the war in a structural context. These were attempts to frame the war as being connected to other structures and events historically and globally. The war was placed in the context of global and national inequality. Links were made to social justice issues, to racism, and to the militarization of our society at home and abroad.

A statement by The Third World Coalition, a committee of the AFSC, pointed out that the public should recognize the structures of racism involved in the war. Once again, they argued, the soldiers were disproportionately black and brown, making up 40% to 50% of the U.S. troops, whereas “Third World people” made up only 25% of the U.S. population (AFSC 2/10/91). Several other documents (especially from the FOR) noted that racism against Arab and Arab-looking people in the U.S. rose during the military buildup and the war. People at home took out their anger on neighbors who had certain features and shades of skin color, blaming them for Iraq’s aggression. This was labeled as misplaced hysteria and as one of the inevitable and unacceptable outcomes of the war. Here the SMOs were attempting to radically enlarge the frame of the war; the war was not just over there, in the Middle East, it was right here, at home.

15George Bush compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler so often that when he failed to do so the omission was considered a newsworthy event by the New York Times and the Washington Post (Dorman and Livingston 1994). From August 1, 1990, to February 28, 1991, Hitler’s name appeared within 25 words of Saddam Hussein’s no less than 1,035 times in the seven largest and most influential major daily newspapers and the two largest news weeklies of the nation (LaMay et al. 1991, p. 42).
Three organizations made an intriguing connection to mainstream environmental concerns. FOR, SF, and the AFSC suggested that this war was about the U.S. maintaining a consumerist lifestyle and a conspicuous consumption of natural resources, especially oil. These organizations believed, and wanted their audiences to agree, that the U.S. mistakenly tried to "police" the world, ostensibly to the benefit of the U.S. SF suggested that the U.S. should learn from this war that it needs a new energy policy that "makes us less dependent on sources we feel we have to protect militarily" (SF 8/7/90). The war was seen as yet another manifestation of international inequalities and the North–South divide. Racist, consumerist, and colonialist attitudes were presented as the core meaning of the military buildup and the outbreak of war. In the following example from the FOR, these patterns were blamed for giving impetus to the war:

The lack of a comprehensive U.S. energy policy has been a major factor in arguments favoring military options as the only viable policy. . . . As the United States prepares to go to war to protect the flow of cheap oil to the industrialized countries, our nation continues to use a disproportionate share of the world’s petroleum resources. With six percent of the world’s population, the U.S. consumes twenty-five to thirty percent of its petroleum resources. This is a painful reminder of our complicity in patterns of consumption to support a lifestyle that is fundamentally unjust and excessively wasteful. (FOR 8/30/90)

What all of the organizations tried to do with their statements was counteract the focus of the government and the mass media on the war as an isolated event in which the U.S. was the hero, protecting the "free world" from rapscallions such as Iraq. Instead, the organizations asked structural questions about the meaning of the war and the locus of responsibility for it, and they offered structural analysis and answers. They were therefore engaged in a radical reframing of the issues.

Costs of the War

In defining the casualties of the war, the SMOs cast a net that went beyond the Persian Gulf. Although all four groups tried to frame casualties broadly, this was a particularly prominent theme for the AFSC and the FOR. More than the racism of the military and the waste of resources was at issue; they claimed that social injustice in the U.S. was increasing, partially because of the war. Instead of paying for an unnecessary war, the SMOs argued, the U.S. should have been creating sustainable jobs, feeding the hungry, housing the homeless, and addressing racism. The casualties of the war could be seen on any U.S. street corner:

In this country, poor and minority people will be the principal victims. The United States is now spending one billion dollars a day to punish Iraq while recession spreads at home, and we do not have the resolve to deal with America’s 20 million illiterate, 3 million homeless, 37 million lacking health care, and 20 million malnourished. With one million of our citizens locked up in prison, we now lead the world in the number of people incarcerated. As King so accurately observed, the bombs that explode (abroad) also explode at home, destroying the hopes and possibilities for a decent America. (FOR 1/18/91)

Thus violence was portrayed as structural as well as direct, and the casualties were said to stretch well beyond the borders of Iraq. Budgetary constraints caused by the war limited social services spending domestically, while unemployment led many poor and working-class people to join the military whether or not they believed in its purpose. In sum, the SMOs argued that the war was unfairly costly for poor and "minority" communities both at home and in the Gulf.

The documents put a number of different spins on the war and its potential costs. The FOR was adamant in its emphasis on civilian immunity in warfare, and equally forceful in its belief that modern-day militaries were unable to preserve that immunity. "The lesson of modern warfare," according to the FOR, "is that the vast majority of those who suffer and die will be civilians" (FOR 1/18/91). The idea of "surgical strikes" was questioned and called a myth:

When war breaks out we cannot forget that not only young soldiers on both sides, but also many women, children and all peoples suffer and scream in very real pain. Families lose be-

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16According to a statement by the FOR: "The wars first thirty days cost more than the entire federal yearly budget allowances for affordable housing, environmental protection, job training, student loans, Head Start for children, alternative energy/conservation, low income legal aid, adult literacy programs, and handicapped education combined."
loved sons and daughters, brothers and sisters. And no matter
how one wishes to articulate the objective, history would hardly
be able to grasp how so many human lives were lost in what
began as a fight over the price of oil. (PC 8/22/90)

The dangers of escalation, including nuclear warfare, were dis-
cussed to reinforce the notion that people needed to realize that
the war could affect them, even if they were not in the forces
deployed to the Gulf region. Because of the possible consequences
of escalation and attendant environmental damages, the war was
framed as dangerous for the entire world community.

In summary, the war was opposed for practical reasons and
on moral principles. The costs of the war were thought to include
military and civilian casualties in the Gulf, budget shortfalls at
home, potential escalation to nuclear war, and the exhaustion of a
nonrenewable source of energy. The framing practices empha-
sized that war had high costs that went well beyond the soldiers
who fought it, and suggested that not everyone shared the costs
equally; nor was anyone completely safe.

The SMOs argued that national resources would have been
better spent on taking care of the home front, and that it is wars like
this one that keep the U.S. from being able to address social issues
adequately. But this was no mere isolationism, for the conflict was
placed in the overall context of working for peace in the Middle
East and changing the unilateral orientation of U.S. responses to
international conflicts. If we were not at war, the groups suggested,
we could be ending inequality instead of undergirding it. Such a
stance would not only be of benefit in this crisis, but might help
forestall future wars.

Strategies of Oppositional Knowledge Creation

Our research uncovered patterns in the oppositional knowl-
dge themes developed by the various groups. How the alternative
accounts were told by each organization clearly reflected its pub-
clic collective identity and definition of its specific audience. These
patterns are somewhat similar to those of the “belief amplifica-
tion” framing practices described by Snow et al. (1986). The

17Snow and his colleagues outline five categories of “belief amplification.” They
include: beliefs about the seriousness of the situation, beliefs about location of cause or

similarity is in the emphasis these organizations placed on naming
who or what is really responsible, and how the status quo defini-
tion of the situation provided an incomplete story of the conflict
and its significance. In some cases individual citizens were seen as
being influential contributors to a solution. Elsewhere it was ar-
gued that mobilized masses had the potential to influence Con-
gress and to change the course of history and the direction of the
conflict. Still other statements focused on the need for U.N.-led
negotiations.

SF organized its information-giving around the constitutional
constraints on who could declare war. It focused on making peo-
ple aware of their citizen’s right to say no to the war and their
responsibility to contact their Congressional representatives. At the
same time, it admonished the Bush Administration for not follow-
ing the correct constitutional procedures.

PC also argued for the illegitimacy of the war, but on the
grounds of the Catholic just war doctrine. It called on its mem-
bership to protest the war and to pray for its resolution. PC provided
knowledge meant to empower the activist by pointing out the
failures of the government actions and suggesting that individu-
als have a responsibility to take action.

The FOR and the AFSC worked on developing an interna-
tional view of the war and international inequality by linking the
direct violence in the Persian Gulf to indirect violence at home.
The FOR highlighted the findings of its delegations to Iraq, em-
phasized the injustices perpetuated by the war, and suggested that
a mass movement of people opposing the war could make a dif-
ference. In its “Crossing the Line Campaign,” each individual was
invited to cross his or her own line in the sand, from apathy to
resistance. The human casualty side of the war, the domestic costs,
and the belief in the potential for nonviolent negotiations formed
the core of the information disseminated by the FOR.

The AFSC, a less membership-oriented organization, aimed
its knowledge-creation activities at international figures and bodies
it believed had some power to take action. Central to the oppo-
sitional knowledge put forth by the AFSC was the idea that this
conflict should be dealt with internationally, not unilaterally by the
U.S. Among other arguments, the AFSC emphasized the idea that

blame, stereotypic beliefs about antagonists or targets, probability of change or efficacy of
action, and necessity to stand up or speak out.
the U.S. would pay a heavy price in domestic costs by being so centrally involved in a war. At the heart of AFSC’s information was the suggestion that the U.S. had not given adequate time to nonviolent or less militarized alternatives and was acting inappropriately and in an imperialist fashion by responding unilaterally.

CONCLUSIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The scope of our research was restricted by the extent of our data set primarily to the interaction between public collective identity and framing processes. Although an organization’s collective identity is rooted in and partly dependent on previous constructions and articulations, it is also temporally and context-specific (Hunt and Benford 1994). Consequently, the present work points to a number of areas that are likely to produce further fruitful research.

For example, an in-depth study of the competing conceptions of collective identity and frameworks of meaning regarding the war that existed within specific SMOs before the organization or its leadership settled on the identity constructions and frames it projected publicly would be especially useful for comparative purposes. It would be valuable to determine whether the internal collective identity processes and framing practices mirrored the public activities we have described. The framing practices of other SMOs during the same period, especially those that occupied different sectors within the movement and represented significantly different constituencies, would also be a useful subject for extension of this study.

Our research suggests that framing activities are not driven simply by the desire of SMOs to increase their membership. In the case of the Persian Gulf War, we have shown that there were, in fact, many factors that influenced and shaped a particular SMO’s framing practices. They included the multiple audiences of the SMO, its historic and contemporary public collective identity, and the desire to gain credibility. All framing activities were performed with a view toward claiming a voice in the public debate, a voice that helped the SMO create oppositional bases of knowledge, sustain and embolden members, establish a historical record of opposition, and perhaps influence public policy.

We do not assess the success of these organization’s framing practices, or the extent to which they influenced public policy. We do suggest, however, that the framing practices of SMOs like those studied here were an important factor in opening political space for opposition to the war. The production of oppositional knowledge grows in significance in the face of government and mass media cooperation in telling a particular story about the type of involvement needed and the history and meaning of a crisis. In the case of the Gulf War, rather than presenting the complexities of the situation, the government restricted information flow and content in an attempt to create a unified belief among U.S. residents of the rationale for the military buildup and the war. The radical reframing of the issues by the SMOs stood as an important alternative in a mainstream milieu largely bereft of opposing voices.

Moreover, our study of the official statements of four national SMOs during the Persian Gulf Crisis and War suggests that there are concrete and distinct patterns in the framing activities of individual organizations. In the case of peace movement participation, it is helpful to view the microstructures of organizational activities to understand better who was being targeted by these groups and how the groups constructed their antiwar actions. A fuller understanding of these framing practices by scholars and activists could enable organizations to define and reach their target constituencies, perhaps more effectively.

Framing is embedded in the larger patterns of power relations that rule society in such a way that SMOs practice framing from the political margins. In times of war, moreover, national security and unity, centralized leadership, and unquestioned obedience are the dominant mainstream frames, heavily supported by the policymaking status quo. To swim against this considerable current requires that peace movement organizations successfully maneuver through a credentialing processes and establish themselves as trustworthy alternatives. Consequently, we raise to the surface the patterns of structure and content that underlie the work of framing

\footnote{See, for example, Eric Swank’s research and analysis of Gulf War protesters (Swank 1993–1994).}

\footnote{Other studies have explored restricted aspects of these issues. For example, the number of peace groups in a Congressional district was shown to be a significant predictor of a vote against the war by that district’s representative in the January 12, 1991, House of Representatives vote authorizing the use of force (MacDougall et al. 1995).}
or reframing and the creation of what we call "oppositional knowledge." In this case, the oppositional knowledge was based on what the SMOs saw as the real meanings, causes, and consequences of the war, and it will long stand as a version of the war's reality that is profoundly and disturbingly different from that put forward by its policymakers.

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