Emmanuel Dechenaux, Ph.D.Associate Professor
Emmanuel Dechenaux received his M.S. in Economics from the University of Toulouse 1 (France) and his Ph.D. from Purdue University. He joined Kent State's Department of Economics in 2004. His research interests are in Industrial Organization, Applied Game Theory and Experimental Economics. At Kent State, Dechenaux teaches courses in Industrial Organization and Microeconomic Theory, both at the undergraduate and the Master's levels.
- Optimal Fines under Announced and Surprise Inspections (with A. Samuel), Journal of Public Economic Theory, 18, 2016, 786-801.
- A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments (with D. Kovenock and R. Sheremeta), Experimental Economics, 18, 2015, 609-669.
- Traffic Congestion: An Experimental Study of the Downs-Thomson Paradox (with S.D. Mago and L. Razzolini), Experimental Economics, 17, 2014, 461-487.
- Announced vs. Surprise Inspections with Corruption (with A. Samuel), European Journal of Political Economy, 34, 2014, 167-183.
- Preemptive Corruption, Hold-Up and Repeated Interactions (with A. Samuel), Economica, 79, 2012, 258-283.
- Endogenous Rationing, Price Dispersion and Collusion in Capacity Constrained Supergames (with D. Kovenock), Economic Theory, 47, 2011, 29-74.